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1	  
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
ARBITRATORS IN CHINESE LAW: 




This article is prompted by a recent Chinese criminal pro-
vision governing the impartiality of arbitration.  The goals of 
the article fare to critically examine the new criminal statute 
created by the provision and to put forward some proposals for 
reform, which could be employed to resolve the tension that ex-
ists between arbitrator impartiality and deference to arbitra-
tion.  Although the new provision appears to eliminate the 
abuse of arbitral power, it may raise more questions than it re-
solves.  This article explores the problems and undertakes a 
comparative analysis of the corresponding U.S. provision, as 
well as an analysis of some cultural and traditional elements 
influencing the new criminal statute in China.  Ultimately it 
will be argued that the concerns can be addressed by fine-
tuning the rule in order to keep a balance between the previous 
two conflicting values. Borrowing from U.S. experience, a 
mechanism of judicial interpretation is proposed that could 
well suit China’s needs because the benefits of arbitration can 
be retained without sacrificing the impartiality of arbitration. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
China’s accession into the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in December 20011 and the growing globalization of the 
world economy has greatly increased international trade and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Law lecturer, Southwest University (China); PhD candidate, Southwest 
University of Political Science and Law (China). The author would like to 
thank Judith A. McMorrow, Professor of Law, Boston College Law School, for 
her guidance and valuable comments throughout the research and writing 
process. 
1 China and the WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
countries_e/china_e.htm.  
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investment within China.  In the wake of the modern explosion 
of international trade and transnational investment, arbitra-
tion has become “the accepted method for resolving interna-
tional business disputes.”2 Arbitration has also become a pre-
ferred method for foreign parties to resolve their legal disputes 
in China, due in large part to the distrust these parties have in 
Chinese courts.3 
In contrast, the United States has a long history of arbitra-
tion.  The US Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA) in 1925.4 The FAA provides that if there is an arbitra-
tion clause, the court shall, on application of one of the parties, 
stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had.5 
“In recent years, U.S. courts have expanded the range of en-
forceable arbitration agreements to include agreements that 
cover areas of law previously thought to be within the exclusive 
domain of courts.”6 
With its acceptance and popularization,7 international 
commercial arbitration now plays a very important role in set-
tling private conflicts.  Parties from different nations tend to 
seek arbitration in order to prevent an abundance of jurisdic-
tional problems.8 Unlike litigation, arbitration provides a neu-
tral venue for international disputes and aims to ensure proce-
dural fairness for both parties.9Arbitration permits parties 
from different countries to exercise a great deal of control over 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International 
Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of a Transnational Legal Order 
6 (1996).  
3 Michael I. Kaplan, Solving the Pitfalls of Impartiality When Arbitrating 
in China: How the Lessons of the Soviet Union and Iran Can Provide Solu-
tions to Western Parties Arbitrating in China, 110 Penn St. L. Rev. 769, 779 
(2006). 
4 Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 213, §§ 1-4, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified at 
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–4 (2011)). 
5 9 U.S.C. §§ 2–4 (2011). 
6 Andrew T. Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling Arbitration and 
Mandatory Rules, 49 Duke L.J. 1279, 1279 (2000). 
7 See Zhao Xiuwen, GuojishangshiZhongcaifa (国际商事仲裁法) [Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration Law] 17 (Renmin Univ Press 2004).  
8 Frederick Brown & Catherine A. Rogers, The Role of Arbitration in Re-
solving Transnational Disputes: A Survey of Trends in the People’s Republic 
of China, 15 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 329, 334 (1997). 
9 See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/1
2015] CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY  3 
how a dispute will be resolved,10 and parties are free to tailor 
the proceedings to meet their needs.  Specifically, parties can 
contract to govern all disputes by a certain set of laws or proce-
dures.11 It is the parties who decide the scope and content of 
the arbitration, define its procedures, and choose the location of 
the arbitration by specifying these stipulations in the arbitra-
tion agreement.12 Most importantly, parties have the power to 
choose the decision maker.13 This freedom to select the arbitra-
tor is why arbitration has been described as “hiring your own 
private judge.”14 Arbitration helps parties not only realize the 
procedural fairness of dispute resolution, but also benefit from 
the predictability to their disputes, lower attorney fees, more 
privacy and expert decision making.15 The finality of arbitra-
tion is another advantage, which is often attractive for its 
speed and cost-effectiveness.16 Arbitral awards are final and 
binding, and can be enforced in the same manner as court 
judgments.17  Particularly, with the well-functioning interna-
tional enforcement system under the 1958 New York Conven-
tion,18 arbitral awards are often easier to enforce than court 
judgments.19 The issue of the impartiality of the arbitrator is 
therefore, critical to the development of arbitration rules and 
cannot be ignored in the process of international private dis-
pute resolution.  The legitimacy of international commercial 
arbitration relies heavily upon the thoroughness of arbitration 
institutions as well as the independence and impartiality of ar-
bitrators.  
While Chinese arbitration has seen remarkable progress in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 2, at 273. 
11 See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 518. 
12 See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 5 (2d ed. 1991). 
13 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW §3.2 (1st ed. 1995). 
14 1 Martin Domke, Domke on Commercial Arbitration §1:01 at 1 (3d ed. 
2001). 
15 See Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Ending Arbitration's Finali-
ty through Functional Analysis, 37 Ga. L. Rev. 123, 157–60 (2002–2003). 
16 See Catherine Cronin-Harris, Mainstreaming: Systematic Corporate 
Use of ADR, 59 Alb. L. Rev. 847, 853–54 (1995–96). 
17 ZHAO, supra note 7, at 5. 
18 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, Jun. 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
19 See Andrew T. Guzman, Capital Market Regulation in Developing 
Countries: A Proposal, 39 VA. J. INT'L L.607, 632 (1998–99). 
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a relatively short period of time, many problems remain. This 
article focuses on criminal liability for biased arbitrators. This 
article is largely prompted by a new criminal provision: Arbi-
tration by “Perversion of Law” (WangfaZhongcaizui), which has 
been incorporated into the Criminal Law of the People’s Repub-
lic of China [hereinafter Criminal Law].20 Through Amendment 
VI in 2006,21 and is designed to punish biased arbitrators for 
their wrongdoings. The goal of this article is to critically exam-
ine the legal regime of arbitrator impartiality in China, includ-
ing this provision, and put forward some proposals for reform.  
Part II provides a brief description of the framework of the ar-
bitration system in China. Part III presents a background of 
Arbitration by “Perversion of Law,” examines the debate on the 
new criminal statute, compares it with some provisions of US 
arbitration laws, and explores the relative Chinese legal cul-
ture, tradition, and economic environment factors that underlie 
criminal liability of arbitrators. Part IV gives evaluations from 
a jurisprudential perspective and offers some reform proposals 
on the basis of borrowing some US experience. Finally, Part V 
provides a summary, along with some concluding remarks. 
Ⅱ . THE ARBITRATION SYSTEM IN CHINA 
Arbitration is by nature quasi-private and procedurally 
more flexible than judicial systems. 22 This allows arbitrators 
to work quickly and more efficiently, which is very important 
for time-sensitive commercial arrangements. Meanwhile, it 
provides parties with other advantages, such as greater cer-
tainty and a higher level of expertise than the court-based sys-
tem. 23arbitration mitigates the jurisdictional disputes amongst 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 ZhonghuaRenminGongheguoXingFa (中华人民共和国刑法) [Criminal 
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by Order No. 83 of the 
President of the Peoples Republic of China, Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 
1997; revised for the eighth time on Feb 25, 2011) [hereinafter Criminal 
Law]. 
21 ZhonghuaRenminGongheguoXingfaXiuzhengan (liu) 
(中华人民共和国刑法修正案(六)) [Amendment VI to the Criminal Law of the 
People's Republic of China] (promulgated by Order No, 51 of the President of 
the People’s Republic of China., June 29, 2006, effective June 29, 2006) (Chi-
na) [hereinafter The Amendment]. For a relatively detailed description of the 
provision, see infra Part III. 
22 ZHAO, supra note 7, at 6. 
23 See Id. at 36. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/1
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parties.24 International commercial arbitration has long been 
regarded as an effective choice-of-forum mechanism of resolv-
ing international commercial disputes.25 Due to the universal 
acceptance of the New York Convention,26 parties cannot re-
solve their disputes in multiple forums if one party contests the 
decision of the arbitral tribunal because the convention pro-
vides for the confirmation of arbitration awards in member na-
tions.27 
There are two categories of arbitration in People’s Republic 
of China: international commercial arbitration and domestic 
arbitration.  Commercial arbitration in China started in 1956 
symbolized by the establishment of the China International 
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC),28 for-
merly known as the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission.29 
In 1959, the China Maritime Arbitration Commission (CMAC) 
was set up.30 Both CIETAC and CMAC are international com-
mercial arbitration, or foreign-related arbitration,31 because 
they were designed to handle disputes arising from economic, 
trading, transportation, and maritime activities involving a 
foreign element.32 The arbitration rules and practices of CMAC 
are virtually identical to those of CIETAC, so international 
commercial arbitration can best be demonstrated by CIETAC.  
In accordance with its rules, disputes arising between Chinese 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See Brown & Rogers, supra note 8, at 332. 
25 ZHAO, supra note 7, at 9-10. 
26 China has been a member of the Convention since 1987. See 
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/contracting-states/list-of-contracting-
state. 
27Article V of the New York Convention provides the limited reasons why 
parties to the Convention should not confirm an arbitration award. New York 
Convention, supra note 18, art. V. 
28 CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION 
[hereinafter “CIETAC”], available at http://www.cietac.org/index.cms (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2015). 
29Arbitration Law sets forth a special chapter dealing with the legal sta-
tus of international commercial arbitration in China's dispute resolution sys-
tem. The history of CIETAC and their arbitration rules can be found under 
“About Us” and “Rules” in the CIETAC website, available at 
http://www.cietac.org/index.cms (last visited Apr. 5, 2015).  
30 China Maritime Arbitration Commission [hereinafter  “CMAC”], avail-
able at http://www.cmac-sh.org/en/home.asp (last visited Apr. 5, 2015). 
31 See CIETAC, supra note 29; CMAC, supra note 30. 
32 See 1995 Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (promul-
gated by Decree No.31 of the President of the People's Republic of China, Oct. 
31, 1994; revised on Aug 27, 2009), art. 65, [hereinafter Arbitration Law]. 
5
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parties and/or parties from Hong Kong, Macau or Taiwan, or 
between Chinese-foreign joint ventures and Chinese parties, 
are within CIETAC’s jurisdiction.33 
In contrast, domestic arbitration has a shorter history.  
With the promulgation of the Arbitration Law in 1994,34 do-
mestic local arbitration commissions were gradually estab-
lished mainly for resolving domestic economic contract disputes 
or cases without foreign elements.35 In addition, there are, in 
theory, at least several arbitration mechanisms for domestic 
disputes.  For instance, employment disputes, some intellectual 
right disputes, and securities disputes are not arbitrated pur-
suant to Arbitration Law, but submitted to arbitration by rea-
son of particular laws.36 Since the disputes are not commercial 
by nature and those tribunals are more like administrative or-
gans, they do not fall within the scope of our present discus-
sion. 
However, a State Council Notice, an administrative regu-
lation dramatically changed CIETAC’s long-standing exclusive 
jurisdiction over foreign-related disputes.37 Article 3 of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 See CIETAC Arbitration Rules (promulgated by the China Council for 
the Promotion of International Trade/China Chamber of International Com-
merce, Feb. 3, 2012,effective May 1, 2012), art. 3, available at 
http://www.cietac.org/index.cms (follow “Rules”). 
34  CIETAC, supra note 29; follow “References”. 
35For example, the Beijing Arbitration Commission (BAC) was founded on Septem-
ber 28, 1995, following the passage of the Arbitration Law. See About Us, BEIJING 
ARBITRATION COMMISSION, http://www.bjac.org.cn/en/about_us/index.html (last 
visited Aug. 24, 2012). 
36 For example, the Law of the People's Republic of China on Labor-
dispute Mediation and Arbitration [ZhonghuaRenminGongheguo-
LaodongZhengyiTiaojieZhongcaiFa] (中华人民共和国劳动争议调解仲裁法) 
[hereinafter Labor-dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law] is applicable to 
the labor disputes. See Labor-dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law, art. 2, 
5.; 
TheTrademark Law of the People's Republic of China [Zhong-
huaRenminGongheguoShangbiaoFa] (中华人民共和国商标法) [hereinafter 
Trademark Law] is dealing with Decisions on Registered Trademark Dis-
putes. See Trademark Law, art. 41; 
The Interim Regulations on the Administration of the Issuing and Trad-
ing of Stocks [GupiaoFaxingyuGuanliZanxingTiaoli] 
(股票发行与交易管理暂行条例) [hereinafter Stocks Regulations]  is dealing 
with the disputes between securities dealing institutions or between a securi-
ties dealing institution and a security exchange. See Stocks Regulations, art. 
80. 
37 Circular of the General Office of the State Council Regarding Some 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/1
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State Council Notice provides that domestic arbitration com-
missions now “have the power to accept foreign-related arbitra-
tions when the parties have agreed to submit disputes to such 
Arbitration Commissions.”38 On the other hand, according to 
the newly revised 2005 CIETAC Arbitration Rules, CIETAC 
can also accept cases involving domestic disputes.39 This allows 
cross-pollinating between foreign-related arbitration matters 
with domestic arbitration commissions, and domestic disputes 
with CIETAC. Indeed, the ambiguity of those provisions ap-
pears to be a source of conflict.40 
Another notable distinction between domestic and foreign-
related arbitration is the difference in criteria required for ju-
dicial review of arbitral awards. The courts, known as the Peo-
ple’s Courts,41 can review not only procedural issues but also 
the legal reasoning supporting the domestic arbitral awards.42 
Conversely, in international arbitrations, the courts are not al-
lowed to consider the legal merits to overturn an award.43  In-
stead, the courts generally scrutinize procedural issues,44 
which conform to the New York Convention.45 
Generally speaking, China’s international arbitral tribu-
nals are better established and more sophisticated than domes-
tic arbitration.46 It is important that they remain distinct from 
domestic arbitral tribunals, which do not share CIETAC’s rep-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Problems Which Need to Be Clarified for the Implementation of the Arbitra-
tion Law of the People's Republic of China, State Council Notice (Jun. 8, 
1996), available at http://www.cietac.org/index.cms (follow “References”). 
38Brown &Rogers, supra note 8, at 346. 
39CIETAC Arbitration Rules, supra note 25, art. 3. 
40See Brown & Rogers, supra note 8, at 347. 
41In China, the courts are named People’s Courts.  
42If a party can prove that evidence on the basis of which the award was 
made had been forged, or the other party withheld evidence sufficient enough 
to have an impact on the impartiality of arbitration, the first party may sub-
mit an application for vacation of the award. See Arbitration Law, supra note 
24, art. 58. 
43 ZHAO, supra note 7, at 18. 
44 See ZhonghuaRenminGongheguoMinshiSusongFa 
(中华人民共和国民事诉讼法)[Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of 
China] art. 258 (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, effective 
Apr. 9, 1992, amended by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 
2007, effective Oct. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Civil Procedure Law]. 
45 Similar provisions can be found in the Convention.  See New York 
Convention, supra note 18, art. 5. 
46 Brown & Rogers, supra note 8, at 340. 
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utation.47 In accordance with the New York Convention, 
CIETAC awards are recognized and enforced in more than 140 
countries.48 CIETAC’s nearly 20,000 concluded arbitration cas-
es have involved parties from more than 70 countries and re-
gions outside the Chinese mainland,49 and its awards have 
been recognized and enforced in more than 60 countries and 
regions.50 Since 1990, CIETAC’s caseload has been one of the 
heaviest among the world’s major arbitration institutions.51 
Ⅲ . THE NEW CRIMINAL PROVISION OF ARBITRATION BY 
“PERVERSION OF LAW” 
On June 29, 2006, at its 22nd meeting, China’s legislature, 
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 
adopted and promulgated an important piece of law: Amend-
ment VI to the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, 
which is the Pervision of Law amendment.52 Under this law, 
biased arbitrators are subject to criminal liability: 
Where anyone who undertakes the duties of arbitration according 
to law intentionally goes against the facts and law and makes 
any wrongful ruling in the process of arbitration, he shall be sen-
tenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years 
or detention.  If the circumstances are extremely serious, he shall 
be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three 
years but not more than seven years.53 
A. Background of the New “Perversion of Law” Criminal 
Provision 
International commercial arbitration developed as an al-
ternative form of dispute resolution because of a fear that for-
eign courts would be biased in favor of local parties, yet the im-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Id. 





52 Article 20 of the Amendment inserted Article 399 (I) after Article 399 
of the Criminal Law, which is titled “Arbitration by ‘Perversion of Law.’” The 
Amendment, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., art. 20. 
53 Id. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/1
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partiality of international commercial arbitration itself is also 
important.54 In order to guarantee the legitimacy of the arbi-
tration process, the arbitral institution must ensure the neu-
trality of the arbitrator.55 Thus, having a neutral and impartial 
arbitrator to resolve commercial disputes is a fundamental goal 
in modern arbitration. In response to this, states throughout 
the world enacted laws to deal with arbitrator responsibility in 
domestic and international arbitration.56 Surprisingly, rather 
than following the policy of the developed nations, China’s legal 
policy on partiality seems to take a slightly different track.  Va-
catur of judgment and refusal of implementation of an arbitral 
award are the universal ways to deal with partiality of interna-
tional arbitration,57 which are also used in China.58 However, 
this recent Chinese statute unexpectedly imposes criminal re-
sponsibility on biased arbitrators.59 
Chinese commercial arbitration, unlike its Western coun-
terparts, is extremely young due to its limited history.  Arbitra-
tion was introduced to China in the 1980s under a policy of in-
stitutional reform and openness to meet the needs of its rapid 
growing economy.60 As an import from the West,61 arbitration 
is still new to a large portion of China’s population.62 The pur-
ported legislative purpose of the new enactment is to regulate 
arbitrators’ conduct and guarantee fairness and justice in the 
course of arbitration, which was once considered a legal loop-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54See Yu Xifu,GuojiShangshiZhongcai de SifajianduyuX-
iezhu（国际商事仲裁的司法监督与协助）80–81 (Intellectual Prop.Publ’gHouse 
2006). 
55See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Grabbert, 590 A.2d 88, 92 (R.I. 1991). 
56See Liu Xiaohong, QuedingZhongcaiyuanZerenZhidu de FaliSikao 
(确定仲裁员责任制度的法理思考) [Jurisprudence Analysis of the Establishment 
of Arbitrators’ Liability], 5HUADONGZHENGFADAXUEXUEBAO 
(华东政法大学学报) [J. E. CHINA U. POL. SCI. & L.] 82, 85 (2007). 
57 ZHAO, supra note 7, at 18. 
58 Id, at 20. 
59See Song Lianbin, WangfaZhongcaizuiPipan (枉法仲裁罪批判) [A Criti-
cal Analysis of the Crime of Distortion of Arbitration Law], 62 BEIJING 
ZHONGCAI (北京仲裁)[ARB.BEIJING] 22, 32 (2007). 
60CIETAC, supra note 29 (follow “About Us”). 
61 LIU XIANGSHU, ZHONGGUOSHEWAIZHONGCAICAIJUEZHIDUYU 
XUELIYANJIU (中国涉外仲裁裁决制度与学理研究) [A JURISPRUDENTIAL STUDY ON 
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRAL AWARD SYSTEM OF CHINA]20 (Law 
Press 2001). 
62 See Id. 
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hole.63 The new provision falls within the category of crimes 
regarding dereliction of duty.64Among those crimes, Article 399 
of Chinese Criminal Law pertains to dereliction of duties of ju-
dicial personnel, which was formally named Civil and Adminis-
trative Judgment by “Perversion of Law.”65 The Criminal Law 
became effective in 199766 while the new Criminal Amendment 
was promulgated in 2006.67 Now that judges face a criminal re-
sponsibility for biased rulings nine years ago, it is not reasona-
ble for an arbitrator to escape from a similar punishment?  As 
arbitration continues to compete with litigation, some contend-
ed that an arbitrator should be similarly liable as a judge if 
they bend the law.68 
In debating the Amendment, many arbitration scholars 
openly objected to the inclusion of the new provision for holding 
arbitrators accountable because holding arbitrators criminally 
liable does not comply with international practices.69 Neverthe-
less, the fear that arbitrators’ power could be mishandled and 
justice could be threatened prevailed over objections to creating 
new criminal provisions for arbitrators. 70 Eventually, this fear 
about the power of arbitrators formed a sound basis for the new 
provision, because this worry is prominent particularly in the 
context of China.71 
Unlike the Western tradition of “rule of law,” China has a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 See Chen Zhongqian,LunWangfaZhongcaizui de Sheli-
Danghuan(论枉法仲裁罪的设立当缓) [On To Delay Setting up the Crime of 
Distorting the Law of Arbitration], 7ZHONGCAIYANJIU (SPECIAL ISSUE) 
(仲裁研究专论) [ARB. STUD.(SPECIAL ISSUE)]1, 2 (2006). 
64 Chapter IX of Criminal Law, which covers from article 397 to article 
419, is named Crimes of Dereliction of Duty. See Criminal Law, Chapter IX, 
supra note 20; see also supra note 38. 
65In accordance with Article 399 of the Criminal Law, Any judicial officer 
in civil or administrative proceedings, who, intentionally runs counter to the 
facts and law and twists the law when rendering judgments or orders, shall 
assume criminal responsibility. See Criminal Law, supra note 20, art.399. 
66 Criminal Law, supra note 20. 
67See The Amendment, supra note 18. 
68 Xu Li, On WangfaZhongcaizui de LifaZhengdangxingTantao 
(枉法仲裁罪的立法正当性探讨) [Research About Its Legislative Righteousness 
Of Crime Of Misuse of Law in Adjudication], 5FAXUEZAZHI (法学杂志) [LEGAL 
STUD. MAG.] 85, 88 (2009). 
69 See Song, supra note 60, at 32. 
70 See Xu, supra note 69, at 88. 
71See Song, supra note 60, at 32–33. 
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unique culture often termed “rule of relationship (guanxi).”72 
Guanxi is a complex web of informal personal connections.73 
The concept is a type of gift economy that involves the “cultiva-
tion of personal networks of mutual dependence and trust.”74 
Someone seeking and maintaining “guanxi” directly or indirect-
ly with those who have an authority over social resources, no 
matter by what means, would have a massive advantage, as 
the latter would repay the former in the future according to 
“Rule of guanxi.”75 “Rule of guanxi,” also operative in Asian so-
cieties,76 appears to make it challenging for parties to find a 
mutually accepted “fair” arbitrator, and even the selection of an 
arbitral institution problematic, because parties distrust each 
other.77 In practice, there exists the risks of arbitrators taking 
bribes and ruling wrongfully.78 The worry whether the other 
party has “guanxi” with arbitrators makes the question of the 
impartiality of the arbitrators deciding their disputes much 
more important. This problem is disconcerting because it might 
lead to a cooling in commerce between China and foreign na-
tions.79 That is, not the outcome China would presently like to 
encourage.80 Understandably, due to lack of arbitrator ethics, 
criminal responsibility would be called for on a biased arbitra-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72Carol A. G. Jones, Capitalism, Globalization and Rule of Law: An Al-
ternative Trajectory of Legal Change in China, 3 SOC. & LEGAL STUD.195, 197 
(1994). 
73 See HUANG GUANGGUO, CONFUCIAN RELATIONALISM (儒家关系主义) 9 
(Peking Univ.Press 2006). 
74Id, supra note 73. 
75See HUANG, supra note 74, at 12. 
76 See id, at 4.f 
77 See Xuan Bingzhao& Zhou Zhibin, WangfaZhongcaide RuzuiZheng-
dangxingFenxi(枉法仲裁的入罪正当性分析)[The Analysis of the Legitimacy of 
Distortion of Arbitration Law], in HEXIESHEHUIXINGFADEXIANSHIWENTI 
(和谐社会的刑法现实问题) [THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF CRIMINAL LAW IN A 
HARMONIOUS SOCIETY] 1758 (Li Jie et al. eds., 2007). 
78ZhangYong & Huang Xiaohua, LunWangfaZhongcaizuiYuShouhuizui 
De Jinghe (论枉法仲裁罪与受贿罪的竞合), 5FAXUEPINGLUN (法学评论) [LAW 
REV.] 120, 120(2008). 
79 See Xu Qianquan, ZhongcaiyuanFalvZerenZhiJiantao II 
(仲裁员法律责任之检讨(下)) [The Criticism of Arbitrators Legal Responsibility 
II], 11ZHONGCAIYANJIU (仲裁研究) [ARB.STUDY] 26 (2006). 
80Fan Mingchao, ShangshiZhongcaiShiyexia de WangfaCaijuezui 
(商事仲裁视野下的枉法裁决罪) [Crime of Distortion of the Law of Arbitration 
under the Vision of Commercial Arbitration], 27 HEBEIFAXUE (河北法学) 
[HEBEI LEGAL STUD.] 125, 129 (2009). 
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tor.81 
A significant consequence of the new provision calling for 
criminal liability for biased arbitrators is that it changes the 
way arbitral awards are judicially reviewed.82 The power of 
courts and public prosecutors will inevitably be expanded to re-
view the merits of an arbitral award, which is beyond the 
standard of procedural review according to the New York Con-
vention.83 In the Chinese criminal justice system, one of the 
important aspects is the dichotomy drawn between public pros-
ecution and private prosecution.84 The criminal cases are under 
public prosecution with exceptions of three categories of less 
serious crimes.85 In the public prosecution cases, the public 
prosecutors, named People’s Procuratorates, bear the eviden-
tiary burden before the courts.86 In the private prosecution 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81See Luo Guoqiang, WangfaZhongcaizuiSibian  
(枉法仲裁罪思辨)[Thoughts on the Crime of Distortion of the Law of Arbitra-
tion], 1ZHONGGUOXINGSHIFAZAZHI (中国刑事法杂志) [J.CHINA’S CRIM.LAW] 63, 
71 (2009). 
82 Id. 
83 See New York Convention, supra note 18, art. V. 
84 Both public prosecution and private prosecution can result in criminal 
punishment. Public prosecution occurs when the proceedings are initiated by 
the People’s Procuratorates with the People’s Courts, while in privation pros-
ecution it is the victim, the victim’s legal representative, close relative, or 
others who are entitled to initiate the proceedings and file a criminal case to 
the People’s Courts. See Chen Zexian, CONTEMPORARY CHINESE LAW 163 
(2009). All cases requiring initiation of a public prosecution shall be exam-
ined for decision by the People's Procuratorates. See ZhonghuaRenmin-
GongheguoXingShiSuSongFa (中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法)[Criminal Proce-
dure Law of the People's Republic of China], art. 136 (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 1979, amended for the second 
time by Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Criminal Procedure 
Law]. 
85 Cases of private prosecution include the following: 
(1)	  cases	  to	  be	  handled	  only	  upon	  complaint;(2)	  cases	  for	  which	  the	  
victims	  have	  evidence	  to	  prove	  that	  those	  are	  minor	  criminal	  cases;	  
and	  (3)	  cases	  for	  which	  the	  victims	  have	  evidence	  to	  prove	  that	  the	  
defendants	  should	  be	  investigated	  for	  criminal	  responsibility	  accord-­‐
ing	  to	  law	  because	  their	  acts	  have	  infringed	  upon	  the	  victim’s	  per-­‐
sonal	  or	  property	  rights,	  whereas,	  the	  public	  secu432rity	  organs	  or	  
the	  People’s	  Procuratorates	  do	  not	  investigate	  the	  criminal	  respon-­‐
sibility	  of	  the	  accused.	  
See Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 85, art. 170. 
86During the course of a criminal case, the People’s Procuratorates have 
the ability to exercise four major powers. First, they have the right to investi-
gate criminal cases assigned to them by the law, and to take all kinds of coer-
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/1
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cases, similar to civil litigation, the private prosecutor (often 
the victim himself) is obligated to prove the wrongdoing of the 
accused.87 Since a crime of dereliction of duty, including the 
Perversion of Law provisions, is a public prosecution case,88 it 
is the People’s Procuratorates rather than the claimant who 
should prove the crime.89  Before bringing the case to the court, 
the Procuratorates are given the chance of substantial review 
of the arbitral award because they need to investigate and col-
lect evidence.90 In turn, the court has to review the merits of 
the arbitration again in order to make a decision.91 This con-
flicts with China’s obligation of procedural review under the 
New York Convention.92 
B. The Debate Surrounding the New Provision of 
Pervision of Law 
The new provision establishes the institutional framework 
for the creation of penal punishment on biased arbitrators.  
However, it raises a host of complicated questions as well, 
which became the subject of national debate. 
a. The Anti-crime Arguments 
Prior to the legislation, the issue of penal punishment up-
on a biased arbitrator had been at the heart of the discussion 
and received a wide range of practical and academic atten-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
cive measures against suspects. Second, they examine cases submitted by the 
police organs and decide whether to approve arrest or to prosecute suspects. 
Third, they have the right to prosecute suspects and to protest the judg-
ments. Last, as a law supervisory organ, they have the right to supervise all 
the criminal processes, including investigation, interrogation, trial and exe-
cution. See Wang Guiguo&John Mo, CHINESE LAW 648 (1999). 
87 The burden of proof in a private prosecution case is on the prosecutor. 
If he lacks criminal evidence and cannot present supplementary evidence, the 
People’s Court shall persuade him to withdraw the private prosecution or or-
der its rejection.  Id. at 652; see also Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 60, 
art. 171(2). 
88 In cases involving crimes of corruption and dereliction of duty, the 
People’s Procurates shall conduct the investigation and initiate a public pros-
ecution. See Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 85,art. 136. 
89 See Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 85, art. 141. 
90 See Xu, supra note 79, at 26. 
91 See Id. 
92 See supra note 84. 
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tion.93 While the new criminal statute was an effort to fill the 
legal gap of liability for arbitrators, many arbitration scholars 
have denounced the statute as having fallen short of its goal.94 
They argued that the criminal responsibility of an arbitrator is 
not in line with international practice, as it disregards the con-
tractual nature of arbitration.95 Additionally, the vague word-
ing makes the provisions’ workability of the new criminal stat-
ute problematic.96 
Arbitration is seen first as a matter of contract, rather 
than a form of adjudication.9 One of the continuing debates is 
indeed whether contract traits rather than judicature charac-
teristics form the cornerstone of and exercises pervading influ-
ence over arbitration.97 Critics argue that analogizing arbitra-
tion to litigation may be arbitrary and imprecise.98 A common 
objection to the new criminal statute is that it is against arbi-
tration’s nature.99 It is important to understand that arbitra-
tion is not litigation with another name.100 An arbitrator per-
forms a task that resembles that of a judge, yet there are 
critical differences between judges and arbitrators. Arbitrators 
charge fees from the parties, whereas judges, as state person-
nel, receive wages from the state budget.101 Further, arbitra-
tors are often experts chosen from the same industry in which 
the dispute arises, and are not always required to have a legal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 See Lu Jing, ZhongcaiYouxianXingshiZerenCheng-
dan(仲裁有限刑事责任承担) [On Limited Criminal Liability for Distortion of 
the Law of Arbitration], 24 ZHONGCAIYANJIU (仲裁研究) [ARB.STUDY] 82 
(2010). See also Liu, supra note 42, at 89. 
94 See Liu, supra note 42, at 88–90.  
95 Chen, supra note 45, at 2–3. 
96 Song, supra note 43, at 26–31. 
97 Xu Qianquan, WangfaZhongcaizuiZhiPipan (枉法仲裁罪之批判)[ A 
Criticism of the Law-bending Arbitration], 3 GuangxiMinzuX-
ueyuanXuebaoZhexueShehuixue Ban (广西民族学院学报哲学社会学版) 
［J.GUANGXI UNIV. FOR NATIONALITIES, ED.FOR PHIL.& SOC.]120, 120–21 
(2006). 
98 As a matter of contract, arbitration is influenced by the respective bar-
gaining strength of each party. Thus, party-appointed arbitrators are a re-
flection of the parties' positions in the dispute. See Rau, supra note _, at 
511;see also Chen Zhongqian, LunWangfaZhongcaizui de Rending 
I(论枉法裁决罪的认定(上)) [On When Should the Court Find a Violation of Ar-
bitration Law I], 24 ZHONGCAIYANJIU (仲裁研究) [ARB.STUDY] 72, 76 (2011). 
99 Chen, supra note 98, at 77. 
100 See Xu, supra note 68, at 121. 
101 See Id. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/1
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education.102 Rooted within international trade, disputants 
have chosen arbitration to settle controversies for hundreds of 
years.103It is the participants who shape the arbitration, which 
is then recognized by a state’s legal system through various 
private dispute resolutions.104The rationale behind arbitration 
is the doctrine of party autonomy: parties’ consent to address 
issues through arbitration should be respected and enforced, 
such that neither of the parties can initiate judicial proceedings 
before the arbitration takes place.105 
Opponents of the new criminal statute also argue that the 
judicial policy should not allow public intervention in the pri-
vate domain when parties have mutually agreed to exercise 
their autonomy to arbitrate.106Under this view, arbitrators’ au-
thority comes from the authorization of the parties instead of a 
state because the private parties have the natural right of self-
regulation.  Therefore, the nature of arbitration should be 
deemed a product of contract between the parties and the arbi-
trators rather than a form of judicature, and as a legal service 
rather than a form of judicial power.107This is particularly im-
portant, as one goal of international arbitration is to limit state 
influence on the dispute resolution process between and among 
international parties.  Otherwise, the expected benefits of arbi-
tration would be dramatically reduced.108 
Additionally, critics doubt that the new enactment is 
workable because of the ambiguity of the provisions.109  It is 
highly likely that in practice the new enactment would not 
function as expected, because the language in Amendment (VI) 
offered little guidance as to what particular conducts constitute 
this crime.110 For instance, the first challenge is how to estab-
lish that the accused is covered by the new criminal provi-
sions.111 Although the person who commits the crime is re-
ferred to as “anyone who undertakes the duties of arbitration 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 See Song, supra note 43, at 33,35. 
103 See LIU, supra note 62, at 2–3. 
104 Id. 
105 Chen, supra note 98, at 73. 
106 Id. at 76. 
107 Id. 
108 See Song, supra note 59, at 36. 
109  See Id., at 26-31. 
110 Id. at 35. 
111 Id. at 30-31.  
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according to law,” the definition of “anyone” is far from 
clear.112Without exception, the description covers both arbitra-
tors and any other personnel working in arbitration commis-
sions.113It has caused some practical difficulties.114 For exam-
ple, an arbitral award is often made on the basis of the 
majority opinion among the arbitrators, and dissenters need 
not provide a signature on the award.115 Suppose some arbitra-
tors showed signs of bias, and others appeared objective.116 It 
would be unjust if an arbitrator who disagreed and refused to 
sign was included as “anyone” and found guilty of Arbitration 
by “Perversion of Law.”117 
Third, defining “intentionally” is another fundamental 
question.  Neither Amendment VI itself nor the Arbitration 
Law provides detailed rules about how “intentionally” should 
be ascertained.118By including this word, it appeared to have 
precluded a “negligent” act.119But it is very difficult, if not im-
possible, to draw a line between an arbitrator’s “intentional” 
disregard of law and a “negligent” mistake in the process of 
handling a case, because it is not easy for the court to discern 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 See Xu, supra note 79, at 25.  
113 See, e.g., Brown & Rogers, supra note 24, art. 31. (discussing “anyone” 
can also refer to the chairman of an arbitration commission in accordance 
with the provision.  Whereas the parties concerned agree that the arbitration 
tribunal shall be composed of three arbitrators, each of them shall choose one 
arbitrator or the appointment to the chairman of the arbitration commission, 
with the third arbitrator jointly chosen by the parties concerned or appointed 
by the chairman of the arbitration commission jointly entrusted by the two 
parties. The third arbitrator shall be the chief arbitrator).  
114 Xu, supra note 79, at 25.  
115 See Brown & Rogers, supra note 8, arts. 53–54. 
116 See Chen, supra note 63, at 78. 
117 See Id. 
118 See Song, supra note 59, at 29–30 (For the argument that the Arbitra-
tion Law provided no guidance for the application of the new enactment). 
119 See Criminal (Commercial Arbitration Law?) Law, supra note 17, arts. 
14–15 (An intentional crime is a crime committed with clear knowledge that 
the act will cause socially dangerous consequences, and hopes for or is indif-
ferent to those consequences.  Intentional crimes always result in criminal 
liability. However, a negligent crime occurs when an act or should foresee 
that his act may cause socially dangerous consequences but continues in the 
action out of carelessness.  Alternatively, a negligent crime occurs when the 
actor has foreseen the consequences but erroneously assumes he can prevent 
them, resulting in such consequences.  Criminal liability is imposed for negli-
gent crimes only when the law so stipulates.).   
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/1
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an arbitrator’s intentions.120In practice, what satisfies “inten-
tionally” is subject to interpretation.121 
Fourth, the problem is particularly severe and disconcert-
ing in explaining the expression “goes against the facts and 
law.”122The word “and” is used in the provision “intentionally 
goes against the facts and law.” Its use indicates that the crime 
exists only when both of the two conditions, “goes against the 
facts” and “goes against the law,” are satisfied.123The new en-
actment is silent about whether a crime exists when only one 
condition is fulfilled.124 
As previously shown, both CIETAC and domestic arbitra-
tion commissions have jurisdiction over international or for-
eign-related disputes.  Following international practice, parties 
often choose what law they want to govern interpretation and 
enforcement of their agreement.125Sometimes, in amicable ar-
bitration or ad hoc arbitration, no applicable law is selected 
and arbitrators are empowered to disregard the strictures of 
legal rules in search of more equitable resolutions to dis-
putes.126Therefore, what specific law do they refer to in these 
situations?  If the applicable law is a foreign law, it is ques-
tionable whether Chinese courts have the competent jurisdic-
tion to make a decision that an arbitral award “goes against” a 
foreign law.127Admittedly, such a decision on a foreign law 
would constitute an infringement of sovereignty of a foreign 
country, in violation of basic international principles.128 
Further confusion arises with respect to the clause “if the 
circumstances are extremely serious” without detailed criteria 
of those “serious circumstances”.129The new enactment is silent 
on this crucial and controversial area, which makes it difficult 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 See Song, supra note 59, at 29-30. See also Liu, supra note 93, at 84. 
121 Id. at 29.63 
122 See Chen, supra note 98, at 78.98 
123 Fan, supra note 80, at 127. 
124 Id. 
125 See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 518 (1974). 
126 See Liu, supra note 103, at 5. 
127 See Song, supra note 43, at 35. 
128 Zhang Junying, ShangshizhongcaiWangfaxingwei de Xingshiguizhi-
Yanjiu (商事仲裁枉法行为的刑事规制研究)[Study on the Criminal Rule of Per-
version of Law in Commercial Arbitration], 4 SHANGCHANGXIANDAIHUA 
(商场现代化) [MARKET MODERNIZATION] 311, 311 (2007). 
129 Song, supra note 43, at 31. 
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for courts to use the provision in deciding what “circumstances” 
would be “extremely serious.”130 
The new criminal statute may also be incompatible with 
China’s international obligations.131As previously outlined, 
China adopts a “two-track” approach in judicial review of arbi-
tral awards, under which Chinese courts are not permitted to 
review any of the legal merits or reasoning except procedural 
issues in international arbitration.132 But bringing in a verdict 
from arbitration by “Perversion of Law” requires first of all a 
substantial judicial review of the arbitral award?133 Courts 
must request the arbitration panel to provide reasons justifying 
its decision in order to judge whether criminal conduct exists, 
but arbitral awards are often rendered without explanation of 
the reasoning or even a complete record of the proceedings.134 
Furthermore, a domestic arbitration commission now has ju-
risdiction over both domestic and foreign-related disputes. An 
arbitrator of a domestic arbitration commission handling do-
mestic and foreign-related cases must utilize different criteria 
for judicial review.135An international arbitrator, who may be 
held criminally liable under domestic criteria, could be immune 
to penal punishment under international standards.136In de-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Id. 
131 See Huang Hui, LunWangfaZhongcaiZuiZhi “Wangfa” Xing 
(论枉法仲裁罪之枉法性) [The “Perverting” Nature of Law-bending Arbitra-
tion], 4SICHUANDAXUEXUEBAO (四川大学学报) [J.SICHUAN UNIV.] 120,124 
(2010). 
132 See Civil Procedure Law, supra note 34, art.274; Arbitration Law, su-
pra note 24, art.58. 
133 For a discussion of the specific difficulties brought by the two-track 
system, see Huang, supra note 100, at 124. 
134 A written arbitral award shall specify the arbitration claim, the facts 
of the dispute, the grounds for the award, the result of the award, the appor-
tionment of the arbitration costs, and the date of the award.  The parties can 
agree to not specify the facts of the dispute and the grounds for the award in 
a written arbitral award. A written arbitral award shall be signed by the ar-
bitrators and affixed with the seal of the arbitration commission. Arbitrators 
with different opinions on the arbitral award may or may not sign the award. 
See Arbitration Law, supra note 24, art. 54. 
135 See Huang, supra note 131, at 125. 
136 While domestic arbitration is subject to judicial review of facts, arbi-
tral decision-making in international commercial arbitration is immune from 
substantive scrutiny after an award is made. International arbitrators actu-
ally do not have a chance to be convicted of “Perversion of Law.”  On the other 
hand, if they could be found guilty of this crime, the courts would have to re-
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termining whether an arbitrator is guilty, the courts must 
scrutinize the merits and reasoning used in arbitration pro-
ceedings.  However, in accordance with the New York Conven-
tion, the courts of member states may only review the proce-
dural issues of international commercial arbitration.137 It is not 
likely for international arbitrators to be convicted of the crime, 
which makes judicial review a deterrent only for domestic arbi-
trators.138  A responsible and capable arbitrator would be over-
ly cautious and understandably reluctant to risk accepting ap-
pointment, which might cause the decline of the quality of 
arbitration and eventually do harm to the development of arbi-
tration as well as the efforts of rule of law in China.139 
The language of the amendment is too vague and simplis-
tic to provide any concrete guidelines in practice, there is only a 
theoretical possibility that a biased arbitrator would be caught 
and convicted of the crime.140After all, corruption occurs in 
subtle manners and open partiality is very rare. The new law 
remains theoretical only since it is difficult to apply in prac-
tice.141 Nevertheless, the Amendment has been criticized as be-
ing over-inclusive.142 Some opine that it only provides moral 
force and there are already enough rules that prevent arbitra-
tor misconduct.143The existing remedies include application for 
the withdrawal and replacement of an arbitrator, application 
for vacation of the award, denial of enforcement of the award, 
notification of re-arbitrating by the tribunal, and rejection of 
the application.144Occasionally, even penal punishment can be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
view the merits and reasoning in arbitration proceedings first, which means a 
violation of China’s obligation under the New York Convention that courts of 
member states are only entitled to reviewing the procedural issues of inter-
national commercial arbitration. See New York Convention, supra note 18, 
art. V 
137 See supra note 84. 
138 See Chen, supra note98, at 78. 
139 See Song, supra note 60, at 35–38. 
140 See Id., at 35, 36. 
141 See Id., at 36. 
142 See Lu, supra note 93, at 82, 85. 
143 See Xu, supra note 68, at 122-23. 
144 According to the Arbitration Law, arbitration shall be carried out in-
dependently and free from interference by administrative authorities, social 
organizations, or individuals; where an arbitrator has privately met a party 
or agent or has accepted an invitation or gift from such party or agent, he 
must withdraw and his name shall be removed from the list of arbitrators; 
where arbitrators demanded and/or accepted bribes, practiced graft or made 
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used.145Similar provisions can hardly be found in most other 
jurisdictions.146 
In sum, the anti-crime arguments criticize the new provi-
sion for its failure to conform with either the nature of arbitra-
tion or the international trend of minimal judicial interven-
tion.147In addition, criticism is more fairly aimed at the new 
provision’s poor wording and lack of guidance, which are also 
regarded as the fatal flaws of the new criminal statute. 
b. The Pro-crime Arguments 
Despite such criticisms, concern for corruption and arbitra-
tor misconduct justifies the use of criminal punishment.148  
Many criminal academics and practitioners support the use of 
penal punishment on arbitrators.149People’s Procuratorates, for 
example, have been strong advocates of the new criminal stat-
ute.150The idea that no arbitrator should misuse his power to 
go against facts and laws intentionally comes from the notion 
that both arbitration and litigation are the means to resolve 
civil disputes and they are in essence the same151Regardless of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
an arbitral award that perverted the law, a party may submit an application 
for vacation of the award.  See Arbitration Law, supra note 24, arts.8, 34, 38, 
58.  Moreover, where one or several arbitrators committed embezzlement, ac-
cepted bribes or practiced graft, or made an award that perverted the law, 
people’s courts shall rule to deny execution of the arbitral award.  See Civil 
Procedure Law, supra note 34, arts. 213, 258. 
145 For example, although an arbitrator who accepts a bribe cannot be 
charged with bribery because he is not state personnel, he may be accused of 
non-state personnel bribery or commercial bribery. See Criminal Law, supra 
note 17, art. 163.  
146 One similar crime is found in 1935 “Criminal Law of Republic of Chi-
na” (Taiwan), Article 124, which stipulated the crime Decision by Perversion 
of Law. But to date, no case has occurred. Therefore, some commentators ag-
gressively contend that this fact proves that arbitrator misconduct is a severe 
social problem only in the drafters’ imaginations. See Huang, supra note 131, 
at 126.131 
147 See Id. at 123. 
148 See Xu, supra note 69, at 88. 
149 Han Yonghong, GuanyuWangfaZhongcaiZhiSikao: JiyuXianshi De Si-
jiao, (关于枉法仲裁之思考：基于现实的视角) [Reflection on Criminal Liability 
of Arbitrators: A realistic Perspective] 26 HAINAN DAXUE XUEBAO 
RENWEN SHEHUIKEXUE BAN (海南大学学报人文社会学版) [HUMANITIES & 
SOCIAL SCIENCES JOURNAL OF HAINAMUNIVERSITY ]144, 145 (2008)(China). 
150 Id. 
151 See Xu, supra note 49, at 88. 
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which law governs, the rule appears to be universally accepted 
that the bias or partiality of an arbitrator whom the parties ex-
pected to be neutral is good cause for invalidating the arbitra-
tion award.152 Further, the new provision would encourage 
high standards of integrity and lasting confidence in arbitra-
tion proceedings.153The pro-crime arguments focus mainly on 
the social harm of arbitrator misbehavior and the quasi-judicial 
nature of arbitration.154  Some contend that the lack of worka-
bility is not a real problem because it can be remedied by 
providing more detailed rules.155  It is also believed that the 
new criminal statute fits within the reality of China’s current 
economic and social situation.156 
Since all adjudicators should be neutral when making a 
decision, the social harm of corruption and misconduct in arbi-
tration is as serious as in litigation, which is regulated under 
the 1997 criminal law as well.157As with most legal debates, 
the issue of the appropriateness of a penalty could not be sen-
sibly examined without taking into account the conduct’s social 
harm. In China, social harm is widely believed to be a relevant 
factor in choosing to promulgate a criminal statute.158The con-
cept of giving more consideration to the maintenance of social 
stability has long been accepted.159An arbitral award is a final 
binding decision equal to and potentially more final than that 
of the judiciary, because an arbitral award is not subject to any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 4 AM. JUR.2D PROOF OF FACTS § 709 (1975). 
153 See Chen Wei, WangfaZhongcaizuiZhuisuFangshiZhiBiangengjiTi-
chang (枉法仲裁罪追诉方式之变更及提倡) [The Change and Advocation of 
Prosecution of Arbitration by Perversion of Law], 
4ZHONGGUOXINGSHIFAZAZHI (中国刑事法杂志) [MAG.ON CHINA’S CRIM.SCI.] 57 
(2008)(China). 
154 See Xu, supra note 69, at 88. 
155 Luo, supra note 81, at 64. 
156 See Chen, supra note 155, at 58-59. 
157 A judge who, intentionally runs counter to the facts and law and 
twists the law when rendering judgments or orders assumes criminal respon-
sibility. See Criminal Law, supra note 17, art. 399. 
158 See Xia Siyang et al., WangfaZhongcaiGaibugaiShouXing-
faTiaozheng(枉法仲裁该不该受刑法调整)[Is the Crime Arbitration by Perver-
sion of Law Appropriate] JIANCHARIBAO (检察日报) [PROCURATORIALDAILY], 
Jan. 23, 2006 at A6. 
159 Yang Mi, LunZhongguoChuantongWenhuade Tezhi Dui Zhong-
huaFaxide Yingxiang(论中国传统文化的特质对中华法系的影响)[The Impact of 
the Characteristics of Traditional Chinese Culture on Chinese Legal System], 
33 HARBIN XUEYUANXUEBAO (哈尔滨学院学报) [J.HARBIN U.] 58, 60 (2012). 
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appellate review.160Arbitrators are usually free to use their 
own personal knowledge in making the decision and are not 
obliged to follow rules of evidence.161  Meanwhile, courts are 
generally deferential to an arbitral award and would not re-
view the legal merits to overturn it.162  These features leave 
the door open to abuse of arbitral powers.163 In reality, arbitra-
tors have an incentive to render an unfair award if they will 
benefit from bribes or other personal benefits.164Arbitrators 
can earn hundreds of thousands to sometimes over a million 
dollars from a single arbitration.165In the case of bribery, par-
tiality in arbitration could result in actual injury to the com-
plaining party and social justice would then be greatly 
harmed.166By promulgating the new offence, the law establish-
es what might be a credible penalty regime imposed on a bi-
ased arbitrator, even though the cases of Arbitration by “Per-
version of Law” are relatively rare.167 It should be kept in mind 
that “no crime without law; no penalty without law” is one of 
the generally accepted principles of criminal law in most juris-
dictions.168 
Another powerful pro-criminalization argument is that ar-
bitration is quasi-judicial in nature,169 and thus should be held 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 LIU XIAOHONG ET AL.,GUOJISHANGSHIZHONGCAIZHUANTIYANJIU 
(国际商事仲裁专题研究) [A MONOGRAPHIC STUDY ON INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION LAW ]432 (2009). 
161 See Burchell v. Marsh, 17 How. 344, 15 L.Ed. 96; Springs Cotton Mills 
v. Buster Boy Suit Co., 88 N.Y.S.2d 295, 298, aff’d 89 N.E.2d 877 (N.Y.); 
American Almond Products Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales Co., 144 F.2d 
448 (2d Cir. 1944); The Guldborg, 1 F.Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1932). 
162 ZHAO, supra note 7, at 18. 
163 See Luo, supra note 82, at 69. 
164 See Xu, supra note 49, at 88.153 
165 John Yukio Gotanda, Awarding Costs and Attorneys' Fees in Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitrations, 21 MICH.J. INT'L L. 1,1–3 (1999). 
166 See Wang Jianbo, XingfaXiuzhengan Liu DiershitiaoWangfaZhongcai 
Zui De Lijie Yu Shiyong 
(刑法修正案（六）第二十条枉法仲裁罪的理解与适用)[Understanding the  
Application of Article XX of the Amendments to the Criminal Law (VI):  
Distortion of Arbitration Law], 
1GUANGZHOUSHIGONGANGUANLIGANBUXUEYUANXUEBAO 
(广州市公安管理干部学院学报) [J.GUANGZHOU POLICE ADMIN.C.]47, 47 (2007). 
167 See Xu, supra note 69, at 88. 153 
168 See Luo, supra note82, at 65. 
169 Xu, supra note 69, at 86. 
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to similar standards as the judiciary.170  For example, it is an 
indisputable fact that arbitration resembles litigation and re-
mains intimately dependent on a national legal system.171  Ar-
bitrators are expected to act like judges who will do justice to 
all parties and guarantee them a fair hearing and a just 
award.172  More importantly, there is an expectation that arbi-
tral awards, like judgments, are to be enforced by national 
courts.173Thus, arbitration cannot be viewed merely as a con-
tract of legal services, but the power to make a judicial deci-
sion, which falls within the authority of the judicature.174Re-
specting parties’ intent to arbitrate under the doctrine of party 
autonomy does not imply a respect for an arbitrator’s freedom 
to disregard the law.175While an arbitrator is a private judge, 
to be a “judge” means to be empowered to make a decision in 
accordance with the law instead of going against it.176  Un-
doubtedly, parties’ genuine intent is not to select a biased arbi-
trator and accept his award by “perversion of law.”177 
Since the lack of workability issue can be addressed tech-
nically, it should not be used as a justification to deny the va-
lidity of the new criminal provision.178It is not concerned with 
whether arbitrator misconduct should be regulated by criminal 
law, but rather how such misconduct can be regulated.179While 
the new provision is far from developed, especially with respect 
to its workability, it seems unreasonable to reject the criminal 
statute based solely on this shortcoming.180  After all, most 
crimes in Chinese criminal law are virtually non-enforceable 
without further detailed rules.181This concern could be better 
met by providing detailed rules on the statute through judicial 
interpretation182 to make it more workable, rather than aban-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Id. at 88. 
171 Id. at 86. 
172 See Chen, supra note 155, at 58. 
173 See Xu, supra note 69, at 86. 
174 See Liu, supra note 57, at 86. 
175 See Xu, supra note 69, at 86. 
176 Liu, supra note 57, at 86. 
177 Xu, supra note 69, at 86. 
178 Luo, supra note 82, at 64. 
179 See Xuan, supra note 125, at 1759.  
180 Luo, supra note 82, at 64. 
181 Xu, supra note 49, at 87. 
182 Judicial interpretation in China is not a precedent based system, but 
involves workable rules enacted by the highest judicial authority, i.e., the 
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doning the statute altogether.183Even with a measure of skep-
ticism, it is reasonable to make an exception and argue that the 
new provision will take an active role in response to corruption 
in arbitration.184Having established the validity of the criminal 
statute, the court can proceed to articulate a judicial standard 
for imposing liability on arbitrators who violate the statute. 
This change is a necessary step to address the appearance of 
partiality and will ensure the new enactment is one that con-
tributes to China’s arbitration framework.185  
The criminal provision is appropriate given the present 
stage of economic development in China.186Due to the underde-
velopment of market economies and the short history of arbi-
tration, absolute party autonomy in some Asian countries and 
districts—such as Japan,187 South Korea,188 and Taiwan189—
appear not to work well resulting from lack of enforcement, 
making it necessary to govern arbitration with strict laws.190 
In addition, while such laws have been attacked for being con-
trary to international practice, some contend that arbitration 
would benefit from the imposition of more severe punishments 
to decrease the possibility of arbitral misuse.191It would ensure 
the healthy development of arbitration and make China an at-
tractive place for international arbitration.192A better devel-
opment of arbitration in those regions appears to be achieved 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Supreme People's Court or the Supreme People's Procuratorates, with the 
view of applying a particular statute. Such rules are enacted in accord with a 
practical understanding of the statute. Procedurally, this manner of interpre-
tation is more flexible and often acts as a valuable tool to avoid the ambiguity 
and awkwardness of a piece of legislation. Inevitably, though, there will be 
some deviation from the legislation’s intent.  For a detailed discussion of the 
idea that the judicial interpretation is to some degree betraying the legisla-
tion, see Chen Jiaxin, ChuyiZuigaorenminfayuande SifajieshiWeifaxianxiang 
(刍议最高人民法院的司法解释违法现象), 5 GUANGXI 
ZHENGFAGUANLIGANBUXUEYUANXUEBA (广西政法管理干部学院学报) [J. 
GUANGXI ADMIN. CADRE INST.POL.& L.] 43, 44 (2011). 
183 Luo, supra note 82, at 64. 
184 See Chen, supra note 153, at 59. 
185 See Luo, supra note 82, at 66. 
186 See Id. 
187 See Luo, supra note 82, at 70. 
188 See Id. 
189 See Id. 
190 See Id. 
191 Chen, supra note 155, at 58. 
192 See Luo, supra note82, at 72. 
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through the support of public power.193Those countries do not 
have to wait hundreds of years to “naturally” raise professional 
quality of arbitrators, establish a code of arbitrator ethics, and 
cultivate social trust in arbitration.194Moreover, given social 
and cultural differences,195 it would be inadequate for China to 
follow the same route of regulating arbitrator conduct as the 
West.  The development of arbitration can be promoted by 
means of legislation, making full use of the advantages from 
both the common law and continental law systems.196 
The qualification of arbitrators is also a key factor in in-
troducing the new criminal statute.  Building a highly qualified 
team of arbitrators is extremely difficult, given that China’s 
market economy has not had much time to develop.197Unlike 
judges, arbitrators are not required to obtain any legal training 
or pass any professional examinations before performing their 
duties.198Arbitral awards are sometimes rendered in favor of 
the party with “guanxi.”199 It is certain the situation would be 
much worse if there were not such a strict requirement regard-
ing the impartiality of arbitrators.200 
In sum, the strength of the pro-crime arguments has come 
to be recognized by legislators. A powerful argument is the 
analogy drawn between the social harm of judicial corruption 
and that of arbitrator misconduct.  If a judge who acts with bi-
as and perverts the law assumes criminal responsibility, why 
should a “private judge” be immune from similar punishment?  
Arbitrators are no less susceptible to corruption than profes-
sional judicial personnel.201At the very least, the new criminal 
statute appears to embody the principle that like cases must be 
treated alike.202Admittedly, the pro-crime arguments are not 
without criticism.  It is universally held that arbitration is dif-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 Id. at 71. 
194 See Id. 
195 See Id. 
196Id. at 72. 
197 See Id. at 71. 
198 Xu, supra note 49, at 88. 
199 The increased risk that Western parties may incur in this aspect of re-
lations with Chinese parties increases the importance of ensuring the impar-
tiality of the arbitrators deciding their disputes. See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 
781. 
200 See Xuan, supra note 125, at 1758. 
201 Xu, supra note 49, at 88. 
202 Id. 
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ferent from litigation; the former has historically been a dis-
pute resolution mechanism for transactions that implicate only 
private law.203 Thus, the power of arbitrators should not be 
deemed to be the same as that of judges.  Apart from the inap-
propriate analogy, the lack of workability is a good argument 
that invites serious consideration.  Of greatest concern is the 
conflict between China’s domestic law and its international ob-
ligations.  Unfortunately, in practice the new provision is not 
likely to serve its purported function.204Thus, it urgently needs 
to be restructured. 
C. Situating the Chinese Debate with the US Experience 
on Impartiality of Arbitrators 
In sharp contrast to the current Chinese approach, which 
has minimal provisions concerning arbitrator neutrality but a 
sharply punitive criminal statute if there is bias “by perversion 
of law,” the U.S. approach has been quite different. As early as 
1632, Massachusetts became the first colony to adopt laws 
supporting arbitration as a means of dispute resolution.205The 
analysis of arbitral impartiality in the United States relies on 
an analogy to judicial impartiality. Arbitrators are viewed in 
the same light as judges and therefore must be held to the 
same standards of impartiality as are imposed on judges.206 As 
a judge is immune to civil and criminal liability for his wrong 
rulings,207an arbitrator does not have to assume any legal re-
sponsibility for a wrong arbitral award either.208 The usual 
remedies for an arbitrator’s unfairness include removal of the 
arbitrator and vacatur of the award.209  The FAA provides that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203See Christine L. Davitz, Note, U.S. Supreme Court Subordinates En-
forcement of Regulatory Statutes to Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements: 
From the Bremen's License to the Sky Reefer's Edict, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L 
L. 59, 63 (1997). 
204 See Song, supra note 43, at 36. 
205In 1925, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was enacted. The statute 
was in recognition of the benefits of arbitration and established a national 
policy favoring arbitration. See Steven A. Certilman, This Is a Brief History of 
Arbitration in the United States, 3 NEW YORK DISP.RES.LAW.10, 10–12 (2010). 
206 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’lCas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 148–
49 (1968). 
207 Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1978). 
208 Liu, supra note 57, at 85. 
209 See New York Convention, supra note 18, art. V. 
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an arbitration award may be vacated “[w]here there was evi-
dent partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of 
them.”210To show “evident partiality” by an arbitrator under 
the FAA, a party either must establish specific facts indicating 
actual bias toward or against a party, or show that the arbitra-
tor failed to disclose to the parties information that creates a 
reasonable impression of bias.211This rule of arbitration and 
this canon of judicial ethics rest on the premise that any tribu-
nal permitted by law to try cases and controversies not only 
must be unbiased but also must avoid even the appearance of 
bias.212Nevertheless, “arbitration differs from adjudication, 
among many other ways, because the ‘appearance of partiality’ 
ground of disqualification for judges does not apply to arbitra-
tors; only evident partiality, not appearances or risks, spoils an 
award.”213 
U.S. courts have established four factors to determine if a 
claimant has demonstrated evident partiality: 
(1) any personal interest, pecuniary or otherwise, the arbitrator 
has in the proceeding; (2) the directness of the relationship be-
tween the arbitrator and the party he is alleged to favor; (3) the 
connection of the relationship to the arbitration; and(4) the prox-
imity in time between the relationship and the arbitration pro-
ceeding.214 
When considering each factor, the court should determine 
whether the asserted bias is direct, definite, and capable of 
demonstration, rather than remote, uncertain, or speculative, 
and whether the facts are sufficient to indicate the arbitrator’s 
improper motives.215A later decision by the Supreme Court ex-
pressed disfavor with any notion that the slightest pecuniary 
interest would constitute evident partiality.216 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 9 U.S.C.§ 10(a)(2) (2011);see also UNIF.ARBITRATION ACT § 12(a)(2) 
(1956); UNIF.ARBITRATION ACT§ 23(a)(2)(A)–(B) (2000). 
211 9 U.S.C.§ 10(a)(2); Lagstein v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, Lon-
don, 607F.3d 634, 645–46 (9th Cir. 2010). 
212 Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150. 
213 Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am.Life Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 617, 621 (7th 
Cir. 2002). 
214 Consol. Coal Co. v. Local 1643, United Mine Workers of Am., 48 F.3d 
125, 130 (4th Cir. 1995). 
215 ANR Coal Co., Inc. v. Cogentrix of N.Carolina, Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 500 
(4th Cir. 1999). 
216 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 n.3 (1986); see also In 
re Equimed, Inc., 2006 WL1865011, at *5 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2006) (remote 
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As discussed above, many arbitral tribunals have a three-
arbitrator panel.217  Under the common arrangement, each 
party designates one arbitrator (party arbitrators or non-
neutral arbitrators)218 and the parties collectively select a third 
(neutral arbitrator).219  Party arbitrators are not expected to be 
as impartial as neutral arbitrators.220  “Evident partiality” is a 
ground for vacatur only for neutral arbitrators, because non-
neutral arbitrators, unless otherwise agreed, serve as repre-
sentatives of the parties appointing them.221In other words, 
“absent overt corruption or misconduct in the arbitration itself, 
no arbitrator appointed by a party may be challenged on the 
ground of his relationship to that party.”222Furthermore, a par-
ty with constructive knowledge of the potential partiality of an 
arbitrator may waive its right to challenge an arbitration 
award based on evident partiality if it fails to object to the arbi-
trator’s appointment or the arbitrator’s failure to make disclo-
sures until after an award is issued.223 
Vacatur of an arbitration award is appropriate under the 
FAA only in exceedingly narrow circumstances, such as when 
arbitrators are partial or corrupt, or when an arbitration panel 
manifestly disregards, rather than merely erroneously inter-
prets, the law.224An arbitration award can only be vacated on 
one of four exclusive statutory grounds: 
(1) corruption, fraud, or misconduct in procuring the award; (2) 
partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral; (3) an over-
stepping by the arbitrators of their authority or such imperfect 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and trivial relationship does not exhibit the required appearance of bias). 
217 A panel of two arbitrators is seldom used because if the arbitrators 
disagree, there is no way of reaching a majority. See Thomas J. Stipanowich 
& Peter H. Kaskell, Commercial Arbitration at Its Best 90 (2001).  
218 Olga K. Byrne, A New Code of Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators: The 
Neutrality of Party-appointed Arbitrators on a Tripartite Panel, 30 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1815,1819 (2003). 
219 Id. 
220 See Id. at 1816. 
221 See Delta Mine Holding Co. v. AFC Coal Props., Inc., 280 F.3d 815, 
821–22 (8th Cir.2001). 
222 Anderson v. Nichols, 359 S.E.2d 117, 124 (W. Va. 1987). 
223 JCI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 103, 324 F.3d 
42, 52 (1st Cir.2003). 
224 9 U.S.C.§ 10 (2011); Metromedia Energy, Inc. v. Enserch Energy 
Servs., Inc., 409 F.3d 574, 578 (3dCir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1089 
(2006). 
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execution of it that a final and definite award upon the subject 
matter submitted was not made; (4) a failure to follow the proce-
dure of this [Arbitration Code], unless the party applying to va-
cate the award continued with the arbitration with notice of this 
failure and without objection; or  the arbitrator’s manifest disre-
gard of the law.225 
A financial interest in the outcome of the arbitration or a 
direct relationship with a party are relevant considerations 
when determining whether an arbitrator's relationship is ma-
terial to the arbitration at issue, for purposes of determining 
whether failure to disclose a conflict of interest warrants vaca-
tur of an award under the FAA.226 
An arbitrator has the obligation to disclose to the parties 
any interest or bias and failing to do so might constitute “evi-
dent partiality,”227 though no specific provision pertaining to 
disclosure has been established in U.S. laws.228In addition, pe-
culiar industry practices and norms are considered in deter-
mining whether an arbitration award is subject to vacatur, 
particularly with an arbitrator’s full and timely disclosures re-
garding business relationships with the parties.229Under the 
evident partiality standard, arbitrators are held to a less strict 
disclosure regime than the appearance of partiality standard 
that applies to judges.230According to the revised Uniform Ar-
bitration Act, an arbitrator has a continuing duty to disclose 
any fact he learns after his appointment if a reasonable person 
would consider it likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitra-
tor.231The arbitrator also has a duty to disqualify himself or 
herself upon discovery of sufficient reasons for such action, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-13(b) (West 2003);see also 9 U.S.C. § 10(a); 
Metromedia Energy, Inc., 409 F.3d at 578; Progressive Data Sys. v. Jefferson 
Randolph Corp., 568 S.E.2d 474, 475 (Ga. 2002). 
226 9 U.S.C. § 10;Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. Ltd. v. St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co., 732 F. Supp.2d 293, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
227 See Ruth V. Glick & Laura J. Stipanowich, Arbitrator Disclosure in 
the Internet Age, 67 DISP. RESOL. J., 22, 23 (2012). 
228Id. 
229 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640, 647–48 (6th 
Cir. 2005). 
230See Claudia T. Salomon, Juan M. Alcalá, Camilo Cardozo, Arbitrator’s 
Disclosure Standards: the Uncertainty Continues, 63-OCT DISP. RESOL. J. 76, 
82 (2008) 
231See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12(b) (2000). 
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order to avoid prejudicing an effective arbitration.232 This self-
disqualification of the arbitrator is required under the Rules of 
the American Arbitration Association (AAA). The rules require 
any person appointed or to be appointed as an arbitrator to dis-
close to the AAA any circumstance likely to give rise to justifia-
ble doubt as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence. 
The circumstances include any bias or any financial or personal 
interest in the result of the arbitration or any past or present 
relationships with the parties or their representatives.233 
In principle, arbitrators are not required to explain an ar-
bitration award and their silence cannot be used to infer 
grounds for vacating an award.234A party seeking vacatur of an 
arbitration award on grounds of evident partiality has the bur-
den of proof;235 to meet this burden, the party must demon-
strate that a reasonable person would conclude that an arbitra-
tor was partial to the other party to the 
arbitration.236Specifically, the party that alleges that an arbi-
tration award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other un-
due means must: 
(1) establish the fraud by clear and convincing evidence; (2) 
demonstrate that the fraud was not discoverable by the exercise 
of due diligence before or during the arbitration hearing; and (3) 
demonstrate that the fraud was materially related to an issue in 
the arbitration.237 
Generally, a controversy of merits between parties to arbi-
tration cannot be challenged as an allegation of evident partial-
ity or corruption by the losing party.238 It is largely for this 
reason that the merits of an award are not subject to judicial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232 See Merrick T. Rossein & Jennifer Hope, Disclosure and Disqualifica-
tion Standards for Neutral Arbitrators: How Far to Cast the Net and What is 
Sufficient to Vacate Award, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 203,205-06 (2007). 
233See AM.ARBITRATIONASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND 
MEDIATION PROCEDURES,R-16(a) (2009). 
234Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 684 (11th Cir. 1992). 
235 See George L. Blum, J.D., Setting Aside Arbitration Award on Ground 
of Interest or Bias of Arbitrators—Torts, 64 A.L.R.5TH 475, § 2[b] Summary 
and comment— Practice pointers (1998). 
236 ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N. Carolina, Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 500 (4th 
Cir. 1999). 
237FLA. STAT. ANN§ 682.13(1)(a) (West 1997); Davenport v. Dimitrijevic, 
857 So.2d 957, 961 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
238 Moncharsh v Heily & Blasé, 832 P.2d 899 (1992). 
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review.239Courts will not review the validity of the arbitrator’s 
reasoning, and may not review the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting an arbitrator’s award.240 Thus, the general rule is 
that an arbitrator’s decision cannot be reviewed for errors of 
fact or law.241In addition, California’s legislature has reduced 
the risk to the parties by providing for judicial review only “in 
circumstances involving serious problems with the award itself, 
or with the fairness of the arbitration process.”242 
The U.S. approach works for a well-developed legal system 
with a strong rule of law model, but it is less clear that it would 
work well for China’s arbitration system.  Perhaps it is because 
the Chinese understanding of corruption, fraud, or misconduct 
is still evolving. Corruption has been long regarded as one of 
the most serious crimes in China. Penal punishment, even 
death penalty has been applied to state officials found guilty of 
accepting bribes.243 Due to the long history of Confucianism in-
fluence of moral teaching, local officials were not only state 
personnel appointed by the central government, but were also 
ideally expected to be models and educators on a moral level, so 
they had another name, “father-and-mother officials.”244 That 
is why corruption became a felony where the officials’ rule was 
not as good as their name suggested.245 In addition, arbitration 
awards have a stronger history of publication in the west than 
in China,246 which makes it more difficult to hide or disguise a 
distortion of law.247  To fully understand why the Chinese ap-
proach of a criminal statute is a rational choice, we need to step 
back and place the arbitration process in the context of the his-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239See Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 916 (Cal. 1992). 
240 Id.  
241Id. at 904. 
242Id. at 905. 
243The death penalty appears to be a harsh penalty for a non-violent 
crime like bribery, particularly from a Western perspective, but in ancient 
China, death penalties once accounted for 40% of the total laws in the dynas-
ty of Beiwei (北魏). See Yang, supra note 160, at 60; Criminal Law, supra note 
17, arts. 383, 385. 
244 See LIANG ZHIPING, XINBOSIRENXINZHA（新波斯人信札) [THE NEW 
PERSIAN LETTERS] 91–99 (China Legal Publishing House 2000). 
245 See Han Xiaolian, ZhongguoChuangtongFalüZhidu de XingfahuaJi-
qiChengyinFenxi(中国传统法律制度的刑法化及其成因分析) [Analysis of the 
Criminalization of the Traditional Chinese Legal System], 
6FAZHIYUSHEHUI(法制与社会) [LEGAL SYS.& SOC’Y] 33 (2007). 
246 See Luo, supra note 81, at 70-72. 
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tory of the Chinese legal system. 
D. Stepping Back: Exploring the “Perversion of Law” 
Provision in Light of the Historical Development of 
Chinese Legal System 
In order to fully comprehend the criminal provision of arbi-
trator responsibility, it is necessary to obtain some perspectives 
on the historical development of Chinese legal system as a 
whole as it functions in practice. The contemporary Chinese le-
gal system is still heavily burdened or influenced by traditional 
forces. Without a fundamental knowledge of the Chinese legal 
tradition, a plain reading of the new provision might lead the 
reader to make a misguided attempt to apply his own ethno-
centric experiences to a quite distinct legal system. This section 
undertakes an analysis of some cultural and traditional ele-
ments influencing the new criminal statute, and demonstrates 
some probable reasons for the new statute from a historical 
perspective.  This author argues that a criminal law-oriented 
legal culture, a civil law tradition, and an underdevelopment of 
market economy in China contribute to the penal responsibility 
of arbitrators.  
a. Chinese Legal Culture 
A law must operate in a cultural context and be impacted 
by the culture around it; yet that culture is in turn affected by 
the operation of law.248Arbitration that falls under perversion 
of law has become a new criminal provision due to various so-
cial and cultural elements.  Chinese legal culture, which differs 
greatly from those of Western countries, is at the heart of the 
issue. The dominance of Confucian thinking influenced Chinese 
attitudes toward law.249 The basic philosophy underlying an-
cient Chinese law is a belief in harmony, which leads officials 
to deal with legal cases in terms of a “situation to be restored” 
rather than in terms of “individuals seeking justice.”250Any re-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248 See Yang, supra note 244. 
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course by citizens to legal process was regarded as a disturb-
ance of harmony and a shame not only for both parties, but also 
for their families, relatives, and clans.251 People became accus-
tomed to endure almost anything rather than go to law, and 
avoided private litigation as much as possible.252 
In accordance with this theory, two prominent characteris-
tics in the Chinese legal system have to be mentioned regard-
ing China’s ancient legal system.  One is that the law was only 
a tool of government policy and all legislation was criminal law, 
named Xing.253Xing, similar in meaning to “war” in old Chi-
nese, originated from the state policy of violence and both con-
stitute two sides of the coin.254 Xing is concerning an internal 
policy of violence, while “war” represents a foreign policy.255The 
law was equated with violence, and there was no bifurcation 
between criminal and civil law. The state took little interest in 
large areas of society, notably the areas of contract and com-
mercial law: sales, loans, and banking.256 These areas could be 
regulated, and were regulated if any state interest became in-
volved.257 Thus, in the eyes of an average Chinese citizen, law 
for a long period of time has just meant one thing: punish-
ment.258Historically, because the Emperor was concerned pri-
marily with maintaining order, his attention, and the attention 
of local bureaucrats, was only incidentally drawn to what 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Style and Spirit of Judicial Judgment in Ancient China – Based on the 
Judgments in Song Dynasty and a Comparative Study with English Law], 6 
ZHONGGUOSHEHUIKEXUE (中国社会科学)[SOC.SCI.CHINA] 206 (1990). 
251 A clan was a grouping of families with a common surname, claiming 
descent from a common ancestor.See FEIXIAOTONG, 
XIANGTUZHONGGUOSHENGYUZHIDU (乡土中国生育制度) [RURAL CHINA & THE 
INSTITUTIONS FOR REPRODUCTION] 54–56 (1998). 
252 Id. at 57. 
253See Liang Zhiping, Zhongguofa de Guoqu, XianzaiyuWeilai: 
YigeWenhua de Jiantao (中国法的过去，现在与未来：一个文化的检讨) [The 
Past, Present and Future of Chinese Law: A Review from the Perspective of 
Culture], 2 BIJIAOFAYANGJIU (比较法研究) [J. COMP. L.] 19 (1987). 
254 See Liang Zhiping, GudaiFa: WenhuaChayi Yu Chuan-
tong(古代法:文化差异与传统) [The Differences and Integration of Ancient Le-
gal Cultures], 3 DUSHU (读书)[READING] 50 (1987), available at 
http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?boardid=2&id=430346. 
255 Id. 
256 See Han Xiaolian, supra note 246, at 34. 
257 See William C. Jones et al., Law of the PRC iii 9-10 (Dec. 28, 1993) 
(unpublished manuscript)(on file with author).  
258 Liang Zhiping, LunLifaWenhua(论礼法文化) [On the Culture of Legis-
lation], 2TIANJIN SHEHUIKEXUE (天津社会科学) [TIANJIN SOC.SCI.]24 (1989). 
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would be called civil matters today.259 
The other prominent characteristic of the Chinese legal 
system is that the law was actually regarded as an accessory to 
moral education, and claims of morality were always held su-
perior to those of law.260For instance, natural harmony would 
best be preserved if men behaved in accordance with the teach-
ing of morality, “Li,” which recognized the inequality of persons 
on account of social status, age, gender and local kinship 
ties.261 Li, used in conjunction with Xing, includes a set of mor-
al standards of conduct in different situations appropriate to 
persons with high social status.262These standards shaped the 
attitudes that were considered to be morally correct and were 
regarded as the ideal for relationships in society.263 If ordinary 
people could be taught Li by precept, example, and symbolic 
ritual, there would have been no need for anything like Xing.264 
But for those refractory persons who failed to make their be-
havior conform to Li, punishments had to be prescribed in the 
form of penal law.265Therefore, the distinction between law and 
morality was sometimes indeterminate in practice.266 
There was no category of public law and private law in ear-
ly Chinese codification.267 Most of these codes focused on pun-
ishment for administrative breaches of bureaucratic procedure 
or for conduct considered disruptive to social order.268These 
laws were all public by nature even though they were common-
ly applied in private fields.269Despite being penal in form, the 
provisions of the codes covered all private matters. For in-
stance, the codes covered loan conflicts, marriage, and succes-
sion, which is classified as “civil” law under Western jurispru-	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260 See THE NEW PERSIAN LETTERS, supra note 245, at 95. 
261 See Liang, supra note 259, at 23. 
262 Id. 
263 See THE NEW PERSIAN LETTERS, supra note 245, at 88-91. 
264 Id. at 95. 
265 Liang, supra note 261, at 28. 
266 See THE NEW PERSIAN LETTERS, supra note 245, at 96. 
267 See Liang, supra note 254, at 52. 
268 Cf.GEORGE JAMIESON, CHINESE FAMILY AND COMMERCIAL LAW 10B 
(1921). (“[O]ver half the [Ching] Code is devoted to the regulation of the offi-
cial activities of government officials.”). 
269 LIANG, supra note 246, at 53. 
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dence.270 In fact, there were few commercial disputes in ancient 
China, which were solved by laws.271 
The criminal law-favored and morality-oriented tradition 
was the mainspring of China’s ancient legal system and meth-
od of law enforcement.272Of the two, the criminal law-favored is 
probably the most important element, as “law” and criminal 
law have generally been considered equivalent in the historical 
context of China.273 The criminal law-favored tradition also 
embodied the need for state rule at that time, which resulted in 
centralization of state power.274  Accordingly, the traditional 
pattern of Chinese government was authoritarian and bureau-
cratic.275 Unlike its western counterpart, there was no concept 
of “checks and balances” or “separation of powers” in China.276 
Moreover, courts have always been a functional arm of the 
Chinese bureaucracy.277 When the concentration of power in a 
society enlarges, inevitably the criminal legal system becomes 
more developed.278 
When the notion of centralization of state power is so dom-
inant that the state and collective interests surpass those of in-
dividuals, any infringement of private rights could be inter-
preted and deemed as damaging to social order and state 
interests.279The state and the people will clearly express their 
attitude towards wrongdoers in the form of revenge and pun-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 LIANG, supra note 246, at 22. 
271 See Han Xiaolian, supra note 245, at 34 
272See Liang, supra note 196, at 20; He Weifang, ZhongguoGudaiSifade 
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Yingxiang(中国古代司法的三大传统及其对当代的影响) [The Three Miracles of 
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China], 3HENAN ZHENGFAGUANLIGANBUXUEYUANXUEBAO 
(河南政法管理干部学院学报) [J.HENAN ADMIN.INST.POL.& L.]2 (2005), availa-
ble at http://article.chinalawinfo.com/Article_Detail.asp?ArticleId=30490. 
273 Wang Luyu, ZhongguoChuantongFalüWenhuade 
XingzhizhuyiTezheng (中国传统法律文化的刑治主义特征) ［A Characteristic of 
Chinese Traditional Legal Culture: Focus on Criminal Sanction], 6 
FAZHIYUSHEHUI (法制与社会) [LEGAL SYS.&SOC’Y] 28 (2008). 
274 Id. at 29. 
275 LIANG, supra note 247, at 54. 
276 See Id. at 49-53. 
277 See LIANG, supra note 247, at 54,61. 
278 Id. at 68. 
279 See Tan Zhongzheng, XingfaJieruShangshiZhongcai de LillunFan-
si(刑法介入商事仲裁的理论反思) [A Theoretical Reflection on the Involvement 
of Criminal law Through Criminalization of Distortion of Arbitration Law], 
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ishment.280The scope of public matters was therefore greatly 
expanded and it is unsurprising that all laws in ancient Chi-
nese society were criminal laws, or at least, laws with criminal 
elements.281This attitude better explains why the partiality of 
arbitrators becomes a social concern and criminal punish-
ment—instead of breach of contract or damages—is eventually 
considered as a remedy to address the problem.282 
At the dawn of the 20th century, a legal reform by the Qing 
Dynasty, the last imperial dynasty, aimed at imitating Western 
legal systems.283 It was generally recognized that if China was 
to play a worthy part in world affairs, the Chinese would have 
to bring their law in line with the modern system of the 
West.284 The most distinguished change was the separation of 
civil laws from criminal laws.285However, the whole develop-
ment of modern law in China was hampered by the inability of 
the regime to create a satisfactory pattern of supporting insti-
tutions.286At the very least, the principle of law reform was ac-
cepted, but much still needed to be done.287To date, the ancient 
Chinese legal tradition continues to impact the legal process in 
at least two aspects.  First, lawmakers are inclined to employ 
criminal laws to maintain stability in large areas of social 
life.288This feature, a distinctive Chinese characteristic, is still 
strong and might remain so in the foreseeable future.289 
Meanwhile, criminal provisions often contain many moral 
statements.290Second, due to lack of a tradition of private rule 	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281 Zhang Zhongqiu,ZhongxiFalüBijiaoYanjiu (中西法律文化比较研究) 
[Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Legal Cultures] 96 (Law Press 
2009). 
282 See Tan, supra note 277, at 78. 
283 Yang Xiaoli, DuiQingmoFalvYizhideSi-
kaoyuJiejian(对清末法律移植的思考与借鉴) [A Thought and Reference on the 
Legal Reform in Lafte Qing Dynasty], 1 LILUNDAOKAN (理论导刊) [JOURNAL 
OF SOCIALIST THEORY GUIDE]110,110 (2010). 
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285 Zeng Xianyi, ZhongguoFazhi Shi (中国法制史) ［Chinese Legal Histo-
ry] 214 (China Renmin Univ.Press 2009). 
286 See ZHANG JINFAN, ZHONGGUOFAZHISHI(中国法制史) [The Legal Histo-
ry of China] 290 (China Legal Publ’g House 2007) 
287 See Id. at 299. 
288 Wang, supra note 274, at 28. 
289 Tan, supra note 280, at 77-78. 
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of law, average people have less trust in private rights and are 
more accustomed to turning to state power for their sense of 
security.291 
Law is generally thought to be a passive instrument whose 
operation can be either promoted or impeded by culture.292The 
distinction between Eastern and Western legal cultures seems 
much more pronounced than the distinctions among different 
Western legal cultures.  The categories and functions of laws 
vary even more across cultures. It is difficult to fill the gaps be-
tween different legal cultures which originated from different 
legal traditions. Taking those diametrically opposed traditions 
into account, the Chinese arbitration system is within the larg-
er framework of China’s national legal system and it evolves 
with that national system.  With no Western rule of law tradi-
tion on one side, and a strong influence from local criminal law-
favored and morality-oriented tradition on the other, it appears 
that penal responsibility of arbitrators is not only the best 
choice in the eyes of Chinese authorities but also desirable for 
the vast majority of people.293This is not surprising given the 
ambivalent value of criminal law for modern China. 
b. Civil Law Tradition 
It was only a century ago that China started systematical-
ly codifying civil laws.294  Following the Legal Reform of Qing 
Dynasty, for the first time a division between civil and criminal 
law was substituted for the traditional classification according 
to administrative departments.295 A civil code was introduced, 
based on the legal codes of Germany and Japan,296 which now 
has a direct offspring in Taiwan.297Legal ideas were directly 
copied from one legal system to the other.298Legislators were 	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294  See Yang, supra note 284, at 111. 
295 See ZHANG, supra note 277, at 291. 
296 Yang, supra note 284, at 111. 
297 Chang-FaLo, The Legal Culture and System of Taiwan 3 (2006). 
298 Xu Aiguo, DaluFaxivu ZhongguoChuantongfade Zhuanx-
ing(大陆法系与中国传统法的转型) [Continental Legal System and the Trans-
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content with formalism and law-making.299  For this reason, it 
is often believed that the contemporary Chinese legal system is 
attributed to the civil law influence.300   
One of the enduring differences between the common and 
civil law systems is with respect to what is actual law.  If the 
law is only defined as statutes, then “law” in China means 
something much different than it does in the United States. It 
is well-known that in common law countries, case law is com-
monly believed to be the main source of the law,301 whereas in 
civil law countries, the law is primarily based on statutes.302  
The latter jurisdictions have put emphasis on legislation, and 
people find themselves with more interests in statute-making 
than dispute resolution.303Civil law judges are thus described 
as “mechanically appl[ying] legislative provisions to given fact 
situations.”304 This feature embodies the deductive method of 
the civil law system,305 which is distinct from the inductive one 
of common law.306  Some jurisdictions have introduced the de-
ductive method into domestic legal systems, as happened in 
China.307In civil law countries, a dichotomy often exists be-
tween “paper law,”308 or the law in published regulations,309 
and a law in action.310  This dichotomy seems more exaggerat-
ed in China than in other countries.311As arbitration is a signif-
icant part of the system of justice on which Chinese society re-	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304 Mitchel de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser, Judicial (Self-) Portraits: Judicial Dis-
course In The French Legal System, 104 YALE L.J. 1325, 1334(1995). 
305 Pierre A. Karrer, The Civil Law and Common Law Divide: An Inter-
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(2008). 
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307 Xu, supra note 229, at 49. 
308 Id. at 51. 
309 Id. 
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311 William Alford, Chinese Living Law: An Interview with Professor Wil-
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society, including our own, there is a distance between formal and actual law. 
This distance may be especially obvious in the People's Republic of China.”). 
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lies,312 it is not surprising that the legislature believes that it is 
in the public interest to establish a generally accepted enact-
ment to regulate arbitration. If punishments are to act as de-
terrents it is important to have them systematized and pub-
lished so that arbitrators would know fully what the 
consequences of wrong-doing would be. It is unclear to what ex-
tent the criminal provision of arbitrator responsibility reflects 
the status quo in China. However, much of China’s formal law 
does not generally reflect practice and has not been developed 
with an eye to existing social realities.313This results in certain 
“regulated” areas being unregulated in practice.314 The over-
confidence in the power of legislation in China helps explain 
the new provision regardless of the significant gap between the 
law de facto and the law de jure. Although officially enacted, 
the new provision does not yet represent actual practice in 
China, and can hardly be expected to function well. 
Another noteworthy aspect is the influence of the role of 
the judge in different legal systems.  Civil law adjudicators 
should mechanically follow the law (statutes), rather than “cre-
ate” the law. 315  Parties go to court only to resolve disputes in 
the civil law system where statutory law, and in particular the 
civil codes, are not interpreted but are rather simply applied by 
judges to determine the outcome of cases.316While civil law 
judges have broad managerial powers, they are expected to ap-
ply the law in an almost mechanical way, remaining a con-
trolled instrument of the legislature.317In fact, there is no room 
for judges’ participation in the creation or transformation of le-
gal rules.318Conversely, it is readily acknowledged that in the 
United States, parties seek to achieve changes in the law, and 
judges make law.319  The task of a common law judge is to 
evaluate counsels’ competing arguments about hyper-factual 	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analogies and subtle distinctions in prior decisional 
law.320Through following precedent, judges can break from 
precedent to create new rules or standards when necessary.321  
They have express law-making and policy-creating func-
tions.322 
In addition, many civil law judges consider it an important 
part of their job to help the parties reach an amicable settle-
ment.323 Judges in the common law system are comparatively 
passive in their fact-finding role.324 Notably, civil law judges 
have more chances to engage in “perversion of law.” Without 
doubt, their impartiality duties need not be, and cannot be, the 
same as those of common law judges.  A common law judge is 
not accountable for his decision, even if unfair, or of any loss 
the parties may thereby incur.325  Nor is an arbitrator, who is 
deemed to be a quasi-judge.326  Decisions that deviate from the 
law would not be considered an inappropriate violation of im-
partiality obligations in the common law system.327 Since a 
U.S. judge has the power to make law, he could hardly be 
charged with “disregard of law.”328 Crimes like adjudicators’ 
“perversion of law” appear to be found only in Asian countries 
with a civil law tradition.329Interestingly, arbitration is not de-
veloped in those countries, which also seem lack of experience 
and international insights.330Arbitration by “Perversion of 
Law” has, to some extent, been a reflection of this orientation. 	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c. Underdevelopment of Market Economy  
The traditional Chinese society differed sharply from the 
contemporary Western one in that the former was an agricul-
tural countryside society while the latter was a society based 
on market economies.331Agriculture was viewed as the natural 
form of economy in ancient China.332 Beginning early in the 
imperial dynastic period, the state adopted a policy of encour-
aging agriculture and restraining commerce.333 The prevailing 
attitude was that war and agriculture were the only occupa-
tions fit for the people.334The law did little to protect mer-
chants. On the contrary, sanctions were placed on those who 
chose to engage in commercial activities rather than agricul-
tural work.335 The Chinese rulers even issued decrees criminal-
izing trade.336This led an entire nation to lose interest in com-
merce.337 Furthermore, Chinese leaders wished to control the 
beliefs and ideas of the populace in order to preserve sociopolit-
ical stability.338 With fewer market transactions, there would 
be less movement among the Chinese, population and lowered 
risk of the exchange and dominance of ideas such as equality, 
freedom, and democracy.339 
Unlike a market economy, which is a society of strangers, 
the agricultural society of ancient China was a society of ac-
quaintances.340 In this society, traditional moral education 
played a more important role than law.341 Confucian thought, 
emphasizing harmony and inequality among people of different 
social statuses,342 had a meaningful influence on government 
and individual behavior. There was a strong sense of extended 	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family and continuity between father and son, ancestors and 
self, and the dead and the living.343Moreover, in a much sim-
pler and closer society, it is much easier to enforce complete 
subordination of the individual to the state, exalt the absolute 
authority of the ruler and regiment all citizens by the merciless 
enforcement of a brutal code of law and punishments.344 
As shown in its history, China suffered a lot from the sup-
pression of the market economy. It produced a poisonous at-
mosphere rather quickly.345Although it dominated the world 
for many hundreds of years, Chinese civilization ultimately fell 
far behind during the Ming dynasty, from 1368 to 1644.346Chi-
nese people began to engage in significant foreign trade during 
the mid-sixteenth and seventeenth century.347 Astonishingly, 
no laws pertaining to trade developed during this time, and 
foreign trade did not create enthusiasm in commerce.348  As 
trade increased, foreign businesses and their governments 
came to exert an accelerating amount of influence over Chinese 
affairs.349China lost many aspects of its sovereignty to foreign 
powers after a series of wars.350The comprehensive attempts to 
create a formal legal system governing commerce began only in 
1979.351 A large body of laws and regulations has been enacted 
with the aim of creating rules that would support an economy 
based on market incentives, while retaining the basic princi-
ples of socialism.352Despite the movement toward market eco-
nomics, real change was a gradual process and the Chinese 
economy still remains, to some extent, under state 	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(2010). 
347 Mao, supra note 339, at 73. 
348 See Id. at 71,73. 
349 See Xu, supra note 229, at 48. 
350 See Id. 
351 See James Hugo Friend, Foreword the Rocky Road toward the Rule of 
Law in China: 1979-2000, 20 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 369, 379, 382 (2000). 
352 See Liang Zhiping, Zhongguotesede FazhiRuheK-
eneng(“中国特色”的法治如何可能) ［How is it Possible to Have a Rule of Law 
with Chinese Characteristics], 3 WENHUAZONGHENG (文化纵横) ［BEIJING 
CULTURAL REV.], 31–32 (2011). 
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trol.353Since an economy based even partly on market princi-
ples requires significant decentralization of economic decision-
making,354 there are conflicts with the centralized state power 
in Chinese legal culture. One must keep in mind that China is 
a country without a tradition of governance by law.355 
Arbitration is widely believed to be an inherently private 
system of dispute resolution and a product of a market econo-
my.356This perception is supported to some extent by the histo-
ry of arbitration and the degree of parties’ control in shaping 
arbitration proceedings.357However, it cannot be taken for 
granted that arbitration in China has the same background of 
a market economy as that in the West.358China’s commercial 
environment is significantly different than the West.  Chinese 
arbitration lacks the purported popularity, custom and ability 
of private governance that American arbitration provides due 
to the incomplete development of China’s market 
my.359While China is transitioning from a centrally planned 
economy to a market-oriented economy, the latter is extremely 
young, having just been formally proposed in the 1990s.360 
There were few arbitrators in the pool with comprehensive 
knowledge of and experiences in trade, maritime, economics, 
and law. The immaturity of the market economy and the social-
ist central planning-featured tradition provide arbitration with 
less soil for growth. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353 See Ji Weidong, ZhongguoFawenhuade Tuibian Yu NeizaiMaodun 
(中国法文化的蜕变与内在矛盾) [The Metamorphosis of Chinese Legal Culture 
and its Internal Contradiction], 4 BIJIAOFAYANJIU(比较法研究) [J. COMP. L.], 8 
(1987). 
354 See, e.g., Donald C. Clarke, Regulation and Its Discontents: Under-
standing Economic Law in China, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 283, 285-86 (1992); 
Robb M. LaKritz, Comment, Taming a 5,000 Year-Old Dragon: Toward a 
Theory of Legal Development in Post-Mao China, 11 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 237, 
256 (1997); Mark C. Lewis, Contract Law in the People's Republic of China--
Rule or Tool: Can the PRC's Foreign Economic Contract Law be Administered 
According to the Rule of Law?, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 495, 503 (1997). 
355 See Friend, supra note 354, at 379. 
356 See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'lCas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 
150 (1968) (White, J., concurring). 
357 See W. Laurence Craig, Some Trends and Developments in the Laws 
and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 30 TEX.INT'L L.J. 1, 5 
(1995). 
358 Wang, supra note 288, at 29. 
359 See Xu, supra note 68, at 120–21. 
360 See Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform after Twen-
ty Years, 20 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 383, 387,405 (2000). 
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It is important to note that the development of arbitration 
in China is not due to the maturity of its market economy and 
the principle of party autonomy, but as a result of government 
promotion. Although arbitration commissions are proclaimed to 
be administratively independent from both the local and na-
tional governmental units in accordance with Arbitration 
Law,361in fact, they are far from truly independent.  Most of 
them are in some respects linked to various administrative au-
thorities in that their existence depends on the manner and 
degree to which they are supported by the local Chinese gov-
ernments.362It is unsurprising that arbitrators are thus easily 
viewed as government officials,363 and the standard of arbitra-
tor impartiality is naturally expected to be the same as that of 
judges.  Furthermore, there is no such a thing in China as a 
code of ethics of arbitrators.364  Therefore, regulation of arbi-
trators can hardly be realized through a common practice, 
market rules of competition, or reputation.  On the contrary, 
regulation must be dependent upon state power and a criminal 
provision.  Nevertheless, the criminal provision cannot com-
pletely replace the code of ethics of arbitrators. 
Ⅳ . EVALUATIONS ON THE NEW CRIMINAL STATUTE AND 
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
China’s arbitrator liability system diverges in some re-
spects from both civil law and common law in order to accom-
modate its peculiar cultural context. One rather unexpected 
move by the Chinese legislature was that it imposed criminal 
responsibility on biased arbitrators, which is rarely found in 
the rest of the world.365 Arbitration is efficient, inexpensive, 
and harmonious.  However, the Chinese legislative attitude 
towards arbitration, shown in the new criminal statute, seems 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361Arbitration commissions shall be independent from administrative au-
thorities and shall have no subordinate relationships with administrative au-
thorities. There shall also be no subordinate relationships between arbitra-
tion commissions themselves; see Arbitration Law, supra note 24, art.14. 
362For example, the People’s Governments of the municipalities shall ar-
range relevant departments and chambers of commerce to organize and es-
tablish arbitration commissions in a unified manner; see id.art.10. 
363 Xu, supra note 69, at 88. 
364 See Luo, supra note 82, at 71. 
365 See Xu, supra note 68, at 122 
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to be unfriendly to arbitrators and discourages deference to ar-
bitration.  As wide discretion is left to the parties, their attor-
neys, and the arbitrators to fashion the procedure as they wish 
without any judicial interference,366 it is possible for arbitra-
tors to “betray” the trust of the parties and rule against the ] 
the applicable law.  To prevent the misconduct of a biased arbi-
trator, holding him criminally responsible appears to be the 
best alternative due to the emphasis on criminal law in the 
Chinese legal culture.  This part undertakes some evaluations 
based on the aforementioned analysis of the new criminal stat-
ute, demonstrating that “when arbitrators step into judges’ 
shoes, they seem to be wearing them on the wrong feet.”367In 
addition, it shows that besides criminal responsibility, there 
are some better ways to regulate arbitrator misconduct.  Some 
possible solutions have also been proposed with the purpose of 
removing the limitations of the new provision and making it 
function well. 
A. Evaluations on the New Criminal Provision 
With the new enactment, the task of ensuring arbitrator 
neutrality in China presents a number of possible barriers, 
both in perception and reality.  While a new criminal provision 
has been articulated, its purported effect is questionable, be-
cause if what may constitute it is very uncertain, the true en-
forcement might not be available.  Additionally, the ambiguity 
of the provision will undoubtedly impact arbitrators’ power of 
discretional evaluation of evidence as well as offer the oppor-
tunity of misuse itself by the judicial authority.  That might in-
fringe the legal rights and interests of the arbitrator and the 
parties.  In discussing the new enactment, this part argues 
that the Chinese legislature made an inappropriate analogy 
when enacting the law, without carefully examining the harsh 
consequences of a criminal penalty.  This results in expanded 
public power with arbitration and increased social cost. Confu-
sion and chaos is eventually unavoidable. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
366See CPR COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF ARBITRATION, COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST: SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR BUSINESS USERS 281–
85 (Thomas J. Stipanowich & Peter H. Kaskell eds., 2001). 
367Rogers, supra note 327, at 57. 
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a. Inappropriate Analogy 
The Chinese legislature made an inappropriate analogy 
between the role of arbitrators and that of judges, in which the 
former are considered virtually identical to the latter.368  Some 
scholars have claimed that if there was a necessity to create a 
new criminal provision dealing with arbitrator misconduct, it 
would be better phrased as fraud or infringement upon proper-
ty, on the basis of contract, rather than a crime of dereliction of 
duty.369 
To ensure impartiality, it is imperative for China to regu-
late the biased arbitrators.  The law makers, however, address 
the concern with a more severe means than may be neces-
sary—criminal liability.370  The law makers probably believe 
that all adjudicators should be neutral when making a deci-
sion371 and arbitrators should behave as impartially as judges, 
which confuses the distinction between arbitration and litiga-
tion.372 
“Despite the resemblance between arbitration proceedings 
and court proceedings, it is important to keep in mind that the 
former is the result of a private contract while the latter arises 
from the state’s authority to resolve disputes and to compel 
compliance.”373Arbitrators, as private actors, “perform their 
function for private gain.”374Consequently, blindly transplant-
ing the criminal provision of Judicial Personnel of “Perversion 
of Law” and applying it to arbitrators is an ineffective method 
to achieve the social goals.375 
b. High Cost to Dispute Resolution 
With the new criminal provision there is going to be in-
creasing chances for state intervention with arbitration. Thus, 
the cost of dispute resolution through arbitration has then been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368 See Liu, supra note 57, at 87. 
369See Huang, supra note131, at 123. 
370 Liu, supra note 57, at 89-90. 
371 Xu, supra note 69, at 88. 
372 Liu, supra note 57, at 89. 
373 Guzman, supra note 6, at 1302–03. 
374 Id. at 1303. 
375 See Song, supra note 43, at 33–34. 
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improperly raised.376  As Arbitration by “Perversion of Law” 
has been provided under the category of crimes of dereliction of 
duty, the suit should be filed by the People’s Procuratorates in-
stead of the complainant.377 The crime of dereliction of duty, 
which the state personnel who exercise state power may com-
mit under the current Chinese law, involve a public prosecu-
tion case.378    Therefore, the People’s Procuratorates have been 
first of all granted the power to review the findings of facts and 
application of laws in arbitration with a view to prove the 
crime before the court.379  Further, in order to determine 
whether a “biased” arbitrator has gone “against facts and laws” 
and render a ruling, the People’s Courts have to examine and 
investigate the substantial parts of an arbitral award again,380 
which is equivalent to a retrial.381  That inquiry, however, chal-
lenges the finality of arbitration. The courts’ power of judicial 
review has been improperly expanded. For many disputants, 
although the resolution is in the name of arbitration, it is the 
court’s ruling that ultimately resolves the case.  Arbitration it-
self serves no important purpose.382  The cost of dispute resolu-
tion has been increased because the new statute seems to im-
pose an additional level of litigation.  The new offence appears 
to be moving farther away from the principle of deference to 
arbitral rulings. 
c. Dilemma 
The Chinese legal system exposes the new enactment to 
embarrassment.  The legislature has put itself and the judicial 
authority into a dilemma, in that the review of the merits of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
376 See Xu, supra note 99, at 124. 
377 Supra note 89; See also Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 85,art. 
136. 
378 Id.  
379 The People's Procuratorates shall be responsible for procuratorial 
work, authorizing approval of arrests, conducting investigation and initiating 
public prosecution of cases directly accepted by the procuratorial organs. 
Crimes of dereliction of duty shall be placed on file for investigation by the 
People's Procuratorates. See Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 85,art. 3, 
18.  
380 The People's Courts shall be responsible for adjudication. Criminal 
Procedure Law, supra note 85,art. 3. 
381 Fan, supra note 81, at 129. 
382 See Id.  
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arbitration is not in conformity with China’s international con-
vention obligations,383 whereas waiver  of criminal responsibil-
ity of biased arbitrators is against China’s criminal statute.  If 
international commercial arbitration is not subject to substan-
tive scrutiny in China (that is a fact nowadays)384, then it fails 
to provide sufficient supervision of arbitral rulings. In fact, in-
ternational commercial arbitrators are not likely to be convict-
ed of the offence and only domestic arbitrators could be held 
guilty.385 This looks like discrimination towards domestic arbi-
trators, which may damage the integrity of China’s criminal 
justice system. On the other hand, to guarantee equal prosecu-
tion, the People’s Procuratorates would have to review the mer-
its and reasoning of international arbitration proceedings, 
which constitutes a violation of the New York Convention.  
Without detailed rules, the crime of Arbitration by “Per-
version of Law” is of little practical value.  Besides what has 
been mentioned earlier,386 the new law has not been defined 
well enough and there is still much ambiguity.  Sometimes an 
arbitral award is rendered through mediation,387 which is not 
required to be in accordance with law.  In such a case, it is very 
difficult to determine whether there is “arbitrator going against 
the law.”388Furthermore, a foreign law is commonly applied in 
international commercial arbitration. It is not appropriate for a 
Chinese court to make a decision concerning the interpretation 
of a foreign law, which may constitute an infringement of for-
eign sovereignty in violation of the basic principle of interna-
tional law,389 since the foreign law is enacted and should only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
383 Id. 
384 Zhao, supra note 7, at 18. 
385 Huang, supra note 133, at 124. 
386 See infra Part III. B. a. 
387 Arbitration Law, supra note 24, art. 51 (“An arbitration tribunal may 
mediate before giving an award. An arbitration tribunal shall mediate where 
both parties voluntarily seek mediation. Where mediation is unsuccessful, an 
award shall be made in a timely manner. Where mediation leads to an 
agreement, the arbitration tribunal shall prepare a written mediation state-
ment or a written arbitral award on the basis of the result of the agreement. 
Written mediation statements and arbitral awards shall have equal legal ef-
fect.”). 
388 See Huang, supra note 133, at 124.298 
389 Fan, supra note 81, at 127. 
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be interpreted by the foreign authority.390Moreover, the deter-
mination of foreign law is another problem, on account of the 
complexities of different languages, inaccurate understanding 
of the laws, and varying legislative intent.391Therefore, Chi-
nese judicial organs’ inherited way of thinking in terms of do-
mestic law might bring about real “verdict by perversion of 
law.”392 In addition, an arbitrator is criminally liable only 
when his or her conduct is “intentional,” but the law is silent on 
the arbitrator’s liability for “negligence” resulting from a lack of 
professional care and due diligence. More importantly, it pro-
vides no clue to distinguish an “intentional” act from a “negli-
gent” behavior. Another absurd situation could occur if a for-
eign arbitral award has been recognized and enforced by a 
Chinese court, but later one of the Chinese arbitrators is found 
guilty of Arbitration by “Perversion of Law”.393 
d. Harsh Consequences 
While many critics argue that the penal punishment of ar-
bitrators is inconsistent with international practice,394 they fail 
to further explain why similar legislations cannot be found in 
most jurisdictions.395 The criminal penalty can result in harsh 
consequences to the individual, his or her family, and indirectly 
to society as a whole.396  A state should avoid misusing a crim-
inal penalty or tailoring the penalty to avoid excessive, ineffec-
tive, or costly penalties.397  In a modern society, with the focus 
being moved towards citizens’ rights and interests, civil laws 
play a more important role than criminal laws.398Criminal 
laws should be cautiously applied, as lawmakers should at-
tempt to procure maximum social benefits—effective preven-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
390 From an international law perspective, the power to interpret law is 
part of sovereignty, which can only be exercised by a national authority. See 
LIANG XI, GUOJIFA (国际法) [INTERNATIONAL LAW] 99 (Wuhan Univ. Press 
2011). 
391 Huang, supra note 133, at 124. 
392 Id. 
393 Id. at 124–25. 
394 Song, supra note 60, at 33; Xu, supra note 80, at 26; Huang, supra 
note 133, at 123. 
395 See Chen, supra note 45, at 2–3 
396 See Han Yonghong, supra note 149, at 146. 
397  Tan, supra note 282, at 68. 
398 See Id.at 68-69. 
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tion and control of misconducts at the expense of minimum so-
cial pay—by use of less or no criminal penalties.399  Even 
though it is submitted that China should address the issue of 
arbitrator impartiality, it cannot put this inclination to an un-
limited extent without considering the potential harms associ-
ated with penal punishment.  This ultimately reflects a nation-
al cognition of the nature of arbitration and the extent of 
transfer of public power to the arbitral right.  Some scholars 
are even worried that the new law might be easily misused 
which, in turn, would deter many foreign candidates that oth-
erwise would have been appointed as arbitrators.400It is like a 
double-edged sword, which might harm both the state and the 
individual.  States should avoid employing the criminal law as 
much as possible, and the criminal law remedy can only be 
considered as a last resort.401 The previous function of criminal 
liability discussed above may be replaced by some other means 
of social regulation, such as a code of ethics or civil liability for 
arbitrators.402  Unfortunately, both the civil law tradition and 
arbitration experience in China do not yet provide a strong 
foundation for these other non-criminal means of controlling 
arbitrator misconduct. 
e. Market Forces 
Arbitration develops along with the market economy, and 
market forces seem to function effectively and play a more im-
portant role than legal rules.403Any change of institution must 
be prudential, especially regarding criminal law, even if confi-
dence in the criminal law is one of the most rooted political 
faiths in China.  Chinese lawmakers seem to think that an im-
perfect __what__ is better than no _what___ given the lack of 
market rules, the absence of industry regulation, a code of arbi-
trator ethics, and civil liability, without realizing that the cure 
is worse than the illness.  In fact, “[e]nsuring the enforcement 
of standards and providing meaningful remedies to those in-
jured by arbitral misconduct is equally as important as articu-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
399 See Id. at 68. 
400 See Fan, supra note 81, at 129. 
401 Chen, supra note 64, at 4. 
402 See Huang, supra note 133, at 125. 
403 See Chen, supra note 63, at 3. 
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lating standards of conduct and professional ethics for arbitra-
tors and provider institutions.”404Thus, arbitral institutions 
should enforce conduct standards enacted in the form of codes 
of ethics.405More importantly, the conduct standards, norms, 
rules and guidelines governing arbitrators’ professional con-
duct must be detailed rather than merely abstract concepts. 
The basic role of arbitration is a sort of legal service, which 
is, in essence, the market participants’ self-regulation and un-
official dispute resolution system without state interven-
tion.406Thus, the issue of quality of service is critical and a 
common criterion is necessary for the healthy development of 
the market.407If it is lower than the standard of the market, 
and the service provider cannot be expelled, the results would 
be a decrease in quality of service and a collapse of the market 
in the end.408In terms of arbitrator impartiality, it is reasona-
ble and fair to make a biased arbitrator—the provider of poor 
quality service—assume some liability.  The core issue here is 
not whether the biased arbitrator should be liable, but how and 
to what extent he or she should be liable. There are some mar-
ket forces that discourage arbitrator misconduct.409Arbitrators, 
wishing to attract business, have an incentive to develop a rep-
utation of impartiality. Arbitrators’ actions may be restricted 
by custom, conscience, and concerns such as caring for one’s 
reputation, risks of law-breaking or being sympathetic to the 
victims so that they are obedient to the law, even though there 
is no legal punishment.410 
B. Proposals for Reform 
As outlined earlier, the newly established criminal liability 
regime for arbitrators in China is riddled with problems.  The 
current regime can be described as a legislator-based system, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
404 Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an Age of 
Mandatory and Professional Arbitration, 88 MINN. L. REV. 449, 458 (2004). 
405 See Rogers, supra note 367, at 58. 
406 See Lu, supra note 93, at 85. 
407 See Fan, supra note80, at 126. 
408 See Id. 
409 Deng Ruiping & YiYan,ShangshiZhongcaiZhiduJianlun 
(商事仲裁制度简论) [On Commercial Arbitration], 11 
CHONGQINGDAXUEXUEBAO (重庆大学学报) [J.CHONGQING UNIV.]117 (2005). 
410 See Chen, supra note 64, at 3–4. 
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which is characterized by paternalism and rigidity.411It ap-
pears that impartiality of arbitration and deference to arbitral 
rulings are two conflicting values.  This problem is particularly 
severe and disconcerting in China.  The simplistic approach of 
the new criminal enactment needs to be reformed because it is 
unable to achieve the goal of arbitrator impartiality.  It is rea-
sonable to expect that detailed rules will emerge in the future.  
This does not suggest, however, that China should wholly 
abandon the use of the new law. 
In discussing the reform of the regime, a better method for 
realizing the goal is through a judicial interpretation of the 
criminal statute, which can benefit from the U.S. experience of 
deference to arbitration. In general, it must be kept in mind 
that “although the arbitrator performs a task that resembles 
that of a judge, there are critical differences between judges 
and arbitrators.”412The goal of a judicial interpretation is to de-
sign an effective mechanism to ensure fairness and justice in 
the course of arbitration and, at the same time, give deference 
to an arbitral award.  In restructuring the criminal provision of 
a biased arbitrator, four aspects need to be taken into consider-
ation: private prosecution, criminal liability for the neutral ar-
bitrator, civil liability, and a detailed definition of the criminal 
provision. 
a. Private Prosecution 
To place an important check, Arbitration by “Perversion of 
Law” would be better interpreted as providing a private cause 
of action.  Rather than relying on heavy-handed public prosecu-
tion, judicial interpretation can make the new criminal provi-
sion rely on private parties themselves to exercise their private 
right of action if there is arbitrator misbehavior. The complain-
ant, instead of the People’s Procuratorates, should accuse the 
“biased” arbitrator of the crime and bear the burden of proof.413  
A comparable U.S. provision requires that a party seeking va-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
411See Tan, supra note 215, at 77–78. 
412 Guzman, supra note 6, at 1302–03. 
413 If criminal evidence is lacking and the private prosecutor cannot pre-
sent supplementary evidence, the court shall persuade him to withdraw his 
prosecution or order its rejection. Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 85,art. 
171. 
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catur of an arbitration award on the grounds of evident partial-
ity must demonstrate “that a reasonable person would have to 
conclude that an arbitrator was partial to the other party to the 
arbitration.”414After such a reform, the People’s Procuratorates 
would no longer have the power to prosecute an arbitrator. 
Converting the prosecution from a governmental power into a 
party’s right could limit the potential for misuse of the criminal 
provision, since it is more difficult for a complainant—who has 
limited power to collect evidence compared to the People’s 
Procuratorates—to demonstrate a violation in court.415  The 
more difficult it is for the complainant to bring an action, the 
higher the threshold rises to implement the new criminal pro-
vision.416 Thus, there exist less potential for the misuse of the 
provision.  In addition, the U.S. experience in proof of corrup-
tion, fraud, and other undue means can be referenced in struc-
turing the private prosecution. 
One potential concern regarding private prosecution is that 
it would promote too much litigation.417  Some critics worry 
that if losing parties in arbitration are able to sue the arbitra-
tor, they will frequently misuse the right.418 This concern is 
misplaced, and it does not necessarily lead to a flood of litiga-
tion.  As the losing party bears a heavy burden to establish 
specific facts that indicate improper motives on the part of the 
arbitrator, he has more difficulties collecting evidence than in a 
public prosecution.  Without sufficient evidence, the losing par-
ty will recognize that his probability of success in a suit against 
the arbitrator is low.  A party that has lost in arbitration will 
also expect to lose before the courts. Often, the losing party ful-
fills the arbitral award voluntarily.  Only a small fraction of all 
parties with disputes make a court filing, and only a small per-
centage of those that are actually filed go to trial.419 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
414 ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., 173 F.3d 493, 500 (4th Cir. 1999). 
415 See Chen, supra note 155, at 62–63. 
416 See Id. 
417 Id. at 63. 
418 See Id. at 56. 
419See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We 
Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Conten-
tious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 5 (1983). 
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b. Criminal Liability only for the Neutral Arbitrator 
The most popular method for appointing arbitrators to an 
arbitral panel in international disputes is for each side to ap-
point one arbitrator, with a third arbitrator appointed either by 
the two selected arbitrators or by the arbitration commission 
(or another appointing authority).420Non-neutral arbitrators 
are long considered agents of the parties in many jurisdic-
tions.421  In the U.S., it is acceptable that non-neutral arbitra-
tors are not expected to be impartial and only the neutral arbi-
trator is required to be “neutral.”422  The most important 
aspect of an arbitrator’s impartiality is the duty of information 
disclosure,423 especially the information concerning a peculiar 
interest or identity.424 
A significant issue, which needs to be clarified, is whether 
the non-neutral arbitrators assume the same penal responsibil-
ity as the neutral arbitrator.425  For example, if an arbitral 
award is rendered on the basis of the opinion of majority, and 
the arbitrators who make the decision are accused of the crime, 
it is not fair for the non-neutral arbitrator to face the same 
punishment, because he is not supposed to be “neutral.”426Non-
neutral arbitrators sometimes are selected because a party or 
its counsel anticipates that an arbitrator of a particular type 
will react favorably to the arguments that party plans to pre-
sent, which, as a potential receptivity, is one of the advantages 
of arbitration.427What non-neutral arbitrators say should have 
no more weight than what the neutral arbitrator says. Unfor-
tunately, nothing in the current Chinese law provides either a 
distinction in liabilities among different arbitrators or a de-
tailed working procedure of the new criminal statute concern-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
420Guzman, supra note 6, at 1279, 1303. 
421 Nathan Isaacs, Two Views on Commercial Arbitration, 40 HARV. L. 
REV. 929, 934-35 (1927). 
422 Byrne, supra note 221, at 1816. 
423See Laurence Shore, Disclosure and Impartiality: an Arbitrator’s Re-
sponsibility vis-à-vis Legal Standards, 57-APR DISP. RESOL. J. 32, 35 (2002) 
424See Salomon, supra note 179, at 80-81. 
425 See Fan, supra note 81, at 127. 
426 Id. 
427 James H. Carter, Improving Life with the Party-Appointed Arbitrator: 
Clearer Conduct Guidelines for “Nonneutrals”, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 295, 
295 (2000). 
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ing the disclosure duty.428 
To ensure a smoother transition and structural adjust-
ment, attention should be paid to the distinction between arbi-
trators on the panel, as they have different incentives in arbi-
tral proceedings.  Exploration of the incentives that make the 
arbitrator free from partiality, exercise good faith and due dili-
gence contributes to our understanding of the roles of panel 
members in commercial arbitration.  There seems to be no good 
reason why all arbitrators should be required to be identically 
impartial since they have varied ways of appointment.  Nota-
bly, some flexibility is necessary.  A clarification should be 
made in future judicial interpretation such that only the neu-
tral arbitrator should be criminally liable for Arbitration by 
“Perversion of Law.”  Such clarification would have a positive 
impact, especially when China is in a critical stage of encourag-
ing the development of arbitration. 
c. Civil Liability 
Rights carry with them corresponding responsibilities, and 
civil liability may be introduced in structuring China’s future 
arbitration regime.  As discussed earlier, arbitration has large-
ly been an alternative process for resolving disputes under pri-
vate law.429It is presumed that parties to an arbitration 
agreement have agreed to bear the risk of the arbitrator’s mis-
take in return for a quick, inexpensive, and conclusive resolu-
tion to their dispute.430“[A]n arbitration proceeding is more 
properly viewed as the product of contract.”431All contractual 
agreements include the obligation to perform in good 
faith.432Where an arbitrator acts partially, it betrays the prin-
ciple of good faith and constitutes a breach of contract,433 which 
gives the injured party the right to sue the biased arbitrator for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
428See Zhang, supra note 128, at 311. 
429See Christine L. Davitz, Note, U.S. Supreme Court Subordinates En-
forcement of Regulatory Statutes to Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements: 
From the Bremen's License to the Sky Reefer's Edict, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L 
L.59, 63 (1997). 
430 See Xu, supra note 112, at 39.  
431 Guzman, supra note 6, at 1316. 
432 See U.C.C. § 1-304 (1999). 
433 Deng &Yi, supra note 410, at 116. 
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that breach.434  If the court determines that arbitrator miscon-
duct existed in a case, the aggrieved party should be entitled to 
damages.435  The arbitrator could demand additional payment 
up front to compensate for the civil liability that he could face 
after the arbitration, which would be costly enough to make ar-
bitration less appealing. In order to attract customers, arbitra-
tors compete not only through the quality of their decisions and 
the desirability of their procedures, but also on price.436A single 
transaction can ruin an arbitrator’s reputation.  This, in turn, 
would give impartial arbitrators a price advantage, as many 
arbitrators are repeat players. 
From a policy perspective, it might even be desirable to 
hold arbitration commissions jointly liable for arbitrator mis-
conduct.  It represents a transfer of the risk of liability from the 
arbitrator to the commission, which is forced to internalize the 
costs of liability—causing it to monitor the behavior of its arbi-
trators.  Assuming that arbitration commissions seek to attract 
business, arbitrators and arbitration commissions will seek to 
develop a reputation for impartiality.  If an arbitrator commits 
Arbitration by “Perversion of Law” on account of pecuniary in-
terest, which would be the situation in most cases, it certainly 
will have some impact on both the arbitrator and the arbitra-
tion commission’s reputation.  They are no longer able to devel-
op reputations for honest dealing. For fear of losing the job, the 
arbitrator, therefore, would have no reason to do anything oth-
er than attempt to act impartially in the same circumstances 
and in the same fashion as judges in the relevant jurisdiction.  
Arbitrators’ current incentive to corrupt is replaced by an in-
centive to avoid unnecessary litigation. As a whole, the civil li-
ability approach would impose a duty on the arbitrator to han-
dle cases in the same impartial fashion as would a national 
court.  Admittedly, there will still be some cases in which the 
risk of bias remains, but a large share of the potential instanc-
es of bias will be eliminated. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
434 Id. 
435 Id. 
436Guzman, supra note 6, at 1328. 
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d. Detailed Definitions 
With carefully defining the conditions of the criminal pro-
vision by listing some of the specific situations, future judicial 
interpretation can help make the enactment more workable.  
The more detailed it is, the more authority the enactment has.  
Taking into account the relationship between the spirit of arbi-
tration and the purpose of legislation in practice, the judicial 
authority may start from the stance of respecting the contract 
nature of arbitration and make some appropriate adjustments 
when interpreting the law.  For instance, the criminal provi-
sion can be more restricted to domestic arbitration than inter-
national commercial arbitration. The “law” should not include 
foreign law, because the criminal law is a public law and 
should be strictly limited to a particular territory.  Also, the na-
ture of arbitration requires more discretion than litigation and 
the criterion of an arbitrator’s “Perversion of Law” should be 
inferior to those of a judge.437Thus, he award does not go 
against the fundamental principles of the civil and commercial 
law, such as party autonomy, good faith and public policy, sub-
stantially as well as equal hearing and admission of evidence 
procedurally. 
Ⅴ . CONCLUSION 
It has been recognized that arbitration rulings must be 
subject to some judicial review to ensure that an arbitral pro-
ceeding has been operative within a state’s legal frame-
work.438This supports the conclusion that the judicial authority 
should act as a watchdog in supervising arbitrators and pro-
vide a remedy when necessary.  According to the pro-
criminalization arguments, arbitrators and judges are both 
subsets of a larger category of adjudicators.  Adjudicators 
should act in the common good. The social harm of their “Per-
version of Law” is the same, and the notion of impartiality is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
437 In accordance with Arbitration Law, disputes shall be resolved 
through arbitration on the basis of the facts, in compliance with the law, and 
in an equitable and reasonable manner. While Civil Procedure Law provides 
that in trying civil cases, a People's Court must take the facts as the basis 
and the law as the standard. Clearly, the requirement of “in compliance with 
the law” is inferior to that of “the law as the standard.”  See Arbitration Law, 
supra note 32, art.7; Civil Procedure Law, supra note 44, art. 7. 
438Deng &Yi, supra note 410, at 117. 
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transferable between these two adjudicatory contexts.  The pro-
criminalization arguments render arbitrator ethics nothing but 
an imitation of judicial standards.  Although there are some 
technical problems, such as poor workability, the new enact-
ment is not simply a deviation from international practice.  It 
manifests a diverse need at different stages of social develop-
ment.  However, anti-criminalization critics believe that the 
roles of the two adjudicators are different in that the arbitrator 
is generally regarded as a private actor while litigation is al-
ways a public activity.  Moreover, the arbitral award may be 
made without explanation of reasons and even a complete rec-
ord of proceedings. Its merits and reasoning are generally not 
subject to judicial review. In other words, substantive issue 
such as finding of merits and application of laws in arbitration 
proceedings cannot be examined.439That is also why such a 
criminal provision is hardly found in most other jurisdictions.  
In addition, the awkwardness resulting from the bad wording 
is difficult, even impossible, to solve.  The new provision causes 
a tension between arbitration impartiality and deference to ar-
bitral rulings.  Meanwhile, the ambiguity of the provision 
makes it hard to function.  To reform the criminal statute, a 
better solution is to use judicial interpretation that borrows 
some U.S. experience.  Judicial Interpretation acts as an effec-
tive mechanism to ensure both impartiality and deference to 
arbitration without abandoning the new enactment. It seems 
that arbitration could get sufficient protection while, at the 
same time, necessary flexibility is preserved for deterring a bi-
ased arbitrator. 
The debate over the criminal statute remains largely in-
conclusive and, as such, will continue in the foreseeable future, 
along with relevant empirical studies.  Proponents of the new 
provision argue that the justice of arbitration and protection of 
the rights and interests of parties can be achieved in practice 
through the regulation of arbitration with state interference,440 
whereas its opponents are against public intervention and be-
lieve that the previous goals can only be realized through the 
development of arbitration itself.441 The possibility of criminal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
439See Huang, supra note 133, at 124. 
440 Luo, supra note 81, at 71. 
441 Chen, supra note 64, at 4. 
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conviction would presumably deter biased arbitrators.  While 
such deterrence is a net social good, there is another risk: 
abuse of the statute by prosecutors. The prosecutor, by threat-
ening to bring a criminal prosecution unless the arbitrator 
rules a certain way, could undermine the independence of the 
arbitration process. 
China has been seeking this balance for years; on the one 
hand, arbitrators should be required to assume liabilities in 
light of arbitral justice for losses of parties incurred from their 
deliberate or negligent misconducts in arbitration.  On the oth-
er hand, to realize the efficiency of arbitration, arbitrators 
should be granted certain immunity when performing their du-
ties. This is necessary for the arbitrators to be free from im-
proper interference and offence.  How to keep the balance de-
pends not only on the understanding of the nature of 
arbitration and the roles of arbitrators, but also on the current 
situation of development of arbitration under a number of cer-
tain social conditions, such as social identification of arbitra-
tion and the overall qualification of arbitrators. This, by its na-
ture, reflects the different attitude towards arbitration.  The 
diversity of culture, tradition, and condition among different 
nations plays a very important role in the distinction of policy 
adoption and law making in each nation.  China may take spe-
cific measures in conformity with its own context to support 
arbitration, so long as those measures of being deferential to an 
arbitral award are applied for the independence and protection 
of the legal rights of parties.  
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